## 1ac

### 1ac – securitized sanctions

#### Welcome to the United States – where cultures that refuse to accept our imperial mindset become threats and we respond by placing economic sanctions upon them – our culture bribes us to accept Cuba as an inferior yet threatening nation – this prevents us from seeking solutions to true oppression and establishes a colonial mindset for Latin America at large

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The United States and Cuba have not had normal diplomatic relations since January 3, 1961, eleven U.S. presidents ago. In contrast, the U.S. refusal to recognize both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China lasted for only ﬁve presidents, sixteen and twenty-two years, respectively. And the United States has not simply declined to have normal diplomatic relations with Havana: Washington has also spent most of the past half century in an open attempt to overthrow the island’s government. There is nothing like Cuba in the history of United States foreign policy. This long-standing estrangement is the product of several concrete concerns related to U.S. security, to U.S. economic interests, and to U.S. domestic politics. But underlying these concerns and governing the policies of the past eleven administrations is an ideology based above all else on a belief, widespread in the United States, that Cubans, like most Latin Ameri- cans, are a stunted branch of the human species. Our euphemism for these people and their societies is ‘‘underdeveloped.’’1

This ideology is not a facade masking selﬁsh interests and, in particular, a selﬁsh interest in eliminating challenges to U.S. hegemony in the Caribbean. Rather, it is most useful to think of this ideology toward Latin America as the software Washington has created to take a keystroke from the environment—a revolution, for example—and process it through the policymaking computer and onto the monitor as policy. Working quietly in the background, this soft- ware is difﬁcult to examine because it is politically incorrect to hint at its intellectual core: a ﬁrm belief that, in any hierarchy of peoples, Latin Americans are beneath the United States. Or as the minutes of a February 1959 National Security Council meeting have the CIA director warning: ‘‘Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the new Cuban ofﬁcials had to be treated more or less like children. They had to be led rather than rebuffed. If they were rebuffed, like children, they were capable of doing almost anything.’’ As one U.S. diplomat reported in the mid-nineteenth century, ‘‘Were it not for the civilizing inﬂuence of the United States, this country would by degrees revert to the aboriginal state in which Alvarado the Spaniard found it.’’2

The best way to begin—but only begin—to explain U.S. policy toward revolutionary Cuba is not with this ideology, but with a frank recognition that senior U.S. ofﬁcials are extremely busy, all but overwhelmed by an endless array of pressing issues, some of them matters of life and death; it would take both time and political capital to terminate today’s complex embargo that has been cobbled together over half a century. Then, after acknowledging the im- portance of inertia, the next step is to observe that the United States has im- portant interests to protect in Latin America, and the estrangement that began a half century ago was largely a response to the Cuban government’s reluctance to address these interests to Washington’s satisfaction. Correctly or incorrectly, wisely or unwisely, the United States came to perceive Cuba’s revolutionary government as a threat to its interests.

For three of the past ﬁve decades, roughly from 1960 to 1990, the most important of these interests was to protect U.S. security. Although small Carib- bean nations lack the power to threaten the United States, their territory can serve other major powers as a launching pad. And so the ﬁrst statement of U.S. policy toward Latin America, the 1811 No-Transfer Resolution, was aimed to stop the British from securing a toehold in Spanish Florida, and the 1823 Monroe Doctrine was based on the same bedrock principle: prudent people keep potential adversaries as far away as possible, and Cuba is close.

‘‘We will bury you,’’ Nikita Khrushchev boasted in 1956, just as Cuba’s revolutionary leaders were planning their campaign to seize power.3 Then in early 1960, a year after the rebels’ victory, he sent the ﬁrst deputy chair of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, to open a scien- tiﬁc, cultural, and technical exhibition in Havana. Before leaving the island, Mikoyan signed an agreement to purchase about 20 percent of Cuba’s sugar crop for each of the following ﬁve years, and within three weeks, President Dwight Eisenhower had authorized preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion. A Soviet-friendly government in Cuba was an unacceptable challenge to the primordial U.S. interest in security.

The Cuban Revolution also attacked substantial economic interests. The U.S. government lost some of its own property, principally Cuba’s Nicaro nickel facility, which the U.S. General Services Administration had built during World War II; remaining U.S. government owned, it was operated by a private contractor, Freeport Sulphur Company, which had been developing is own nickel and cobalt mine at Moa Bay, forty miles to the east. Freeport lost that, too, and other U.S. investors suffered losses valued at about $2 billion at a time when a billion was more than pocket change. More than six thousand of those investors ﬁled claims with the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, and some were extremely well-connected corporate leaders, such as Robert Kle- berg, the president of King Ranch in Texas, which lost its forty-thousand-acre ranch in Cienfuegos. With help from his representative in Congress, the Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson, Kleberg promptly marched into the Oval Ofﬁce, demanded President Eisenhower’s help, and got it—a full-court press by U.S. diplomats.

But most investors of Robert Kleberg’s generation wrote off their losses decades ago, and in the post–Cold War era, they have been replaced by a new set of powerful economic interests seeking to reopen trade with the island. Agri- business, the single most powerful lobbying force in Washington, has been key. It took U.S. farmers almost a decade, but in 2000, they ﬁnally pushed through a law that permits the sale of food to Cuba. At ﬁrst Cuba declined to buy, insisting on normal two-way trade, but then it reconsidered after a devastating hurricane in 2001; and the year ended with a boatload of U.S. poultry sailing into Havana’s harbor. It was the ﬁrst signiﬁcant trade with Cuba since 1963.

Cubans apparently liked what they bought, and soon the invisible hand of supply and demand—combined with low shipping costs—began to work its magic. In early 2002, six House Democrats visited the island, including the Arkansas moderate Vic Snyder, touting the rice and pork his constituents pro- duced. Then came a delegation of California producers led by Senator Barbara Boxer, and a North Dakota delegation led by Republican governor John Hoe- ven followed her. The North Dakotans left Havana only hours before two more members of Congress arrived with a delegation featuring a former secretary of agriculture, and this congressional delegation overlapped with a visit by Tam- pa’s mayor Richard Greco, who was shepherding ﬁfteen local business leaders hoping to convince Cubans to use their port for food shipments.

These visits were but a prelude to the main event in 2003: a privately organized food exhibition in Havana featuring 933 representatives of 288 U.S. vendors from thirty-three states and Puerto Rico, plus the agriculture commis- sioners from ten states, all eager to tap into the Cuban market. More than seventy U.S. ﬁrms signed more than $92 million in sales contracts, and North Carolina’s agriculture commissioner drafted an op-ed article on her ﬂight home: ‘‘With our economy on the skids, state budgets in shambles and our farmers going bank- rupt, does it make any sense to continue a 40-year-old embargo with Cuba when there is so much to be gained by both countries? I don’t think so.’’ What was the result? In 2008, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that U.S. farmers had become ‘‘Cuba’s largest supplier of food and agricultural products. Cuba has consistently ranked among the top ten export markets for U.S. soybean oil, dry peas, lentils, dry beans, rice, powdered milk and poultry. Cuba also has been a major market for U.S. corn, wheat and soybeans.’’4

So here we are, at a time when national security ofﬁcials no longer have a signiﬁcant interest in Cuba and economic interests are no longer a negative. Why does the estrangement continue? Enter the Cuban American community in Florida, which holds part—but only part—of the answer: a third interest, domestic politics or, more concretely, the interest politicians have in winning elections. As a former chief of the U.S. interests section pointed out in 2005: ‘‘Ninety-eight percent of U.S. citizens never think of Cuba; the only people who think Cuba is important are the Cubans in Miami.’’5 No one would have paid these 1.2 million immigrants much attention if they had settled in Ver- mont, which has only three votes in the U.S. electoral college; but two-thirds chose to settle in booming Florida, which has twenty-seven votes, today’s fourth-largest prize in the quadrennial electoral college sweepstakes, and after the 2010 census, Florida could move into a tie for third with New York, with twenty-nine (New York now has thirty-one but will likely lose two; Florida has twenty-seven and will probably gain two).

At ﬁrst, Cuban immigrants were politically impotent, but soon they began to take out citizenship papers, and then in the 1970s, they started to elbow their way into politics, initially at the local level, where they competed for school boards and similar community councils. Then they set out to elect members of the state legislature, and they also started to form interest groups, capped in 1981 by the creation of the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), which moved Cuban Americans up the political food chain to the national level. Primarily, CANF spoke for wealthy ﬁrst-wave immigrants who were largely uninterested in the pork-barrel politics that typically characterize ﬁrst- and second-generation immigrants; instead, CANF’s goal was to inﬂuence U.S. policy toward Cuba, and it did so the old-fashioned way, with campaign contri- butions and bloc voting.6

And CANF did this at a propitious moment: it had spent the 1980s honing its political skills on legislation creating Radio and TV Martí. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, the foundation was a recognized force in Washington, perfectly positioned to move into the vacuum left by exiting national security ofﬁcials. With its focus on tightening the embargo, CANF was responsible for both the 1992 Cuban Democracy (Torricelli) Act, passed by a Democratic Con- gress and signed by a Republican president, and then for initiating the campaign against third-country investors in Cuba that led to the Cuban Liberty and Demo- cratic (LIBERTAD) Solidarity Act of 1996 (the Helms-Burton Act), passed by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democratic president.7 Helms-Burton prompted the frustrated chief executive ofﬁcer of the agribusiness heavyweight Archer Daniels Midland, eager to reopen an old market, to complain that ‘‘every presidential candidate is invited to Miami to make a speech to a handful of rich Cubans, and the candidate says, ‘I will never speak to Castro.’ The result is that we look to the rest of the world like idiots.’’8

Then came Elián González, the ﬁve-year-old boy found clinging to an inner tube off Fort Lauderdale on Thanksgiving Day in 1999. Since his mother had drowned after their rickety boat had capsized, and sending Elián back to live with a loving father in Cuba had been the right thing to do, President Bill Clinton wrote in his memoir: ‘‘I was still concerned that it could cost Al Gore Florida in November.’’9 The charges of fraud in Florida’s 2000 election were multiple and centered on the exclusion of more than ﬁfty thousand African American voters, but anyone who had followed Elián’s prolonged ordeal could reasonably con- clude that his return had aroused intense anger in Little Havana. And although it is important not to overstate Cuban American voting clout, one thing is certain: when the dust settled in 2000, the Democrats had lost the state by 537 votes, handing all of Florida’s electoral votes to the Republicans and giving George W. Bush the presidency with a ﬁve-vote electoral college margin.

Since then, the question has been: When will Cuban Americans begin to vote their broader interests—when will they cast their ballots and distribute their campaign contributions on some basis other than which party’s candidates promise to be more vigorous in their hostility toward the government of the country from which they or their forebears emigrated? Much public opinion polling and the 2008 election, when Barack Obama captured about 35 percent of Cuban American votes, have suggested that signiﬁcant dispersion is already occurring; but today’s politicians are still walking a very thin line, as candidate Barack Obama’s Miami speech to CANF illustrated in May 2008. While prom- ising to maintain the embargo as leverage, he argued that ‘‘the United States must be a relentless advocate for democracy.’’ Obama also promised to ‘‘imme- diately allow unlimited family travel and remittances to the island.’’

When implemented in 2009, this relaxation of the embargo’s travel and remittance provisions more than reversed a tightening in 2004, just before that year’s election, when Cuban Americans were feeling neglected. In 2001, his ﬁrst year as president, George W. Bush had presided over a May 20 Indepen- dence Day celebration with a party for Cuban American leaders on the White House lawn. The next year, 2002, was the hundredth anniversary of Cuban independence, and President Bush had ﬂown to Miami to participate in the celebration. But in 2003, when the Iraq War had become a consuming focus, the president’s Independence Day message had been nothing but a forty-second prerecorded restatement of what President Clinton had said a decade earlier: ‘‘My hope is for the Cuban people to soon enjoy the same freedoms and rights as we do.’’ Then a few weeks later, the U.S. Coast Guard had intercepted a hijacked boat in the Straits of Florida and returned the hijackers to Cuba.

Enough is enough, wrote ninety-eight prominent Cuban Americans, taking out an ad in El Nuevo Herald on 3 August 2003, complaining in an open letter to the president that ‘‘current policy toward Cuba has not varied signiﬁcantly from that of the previous administration.’’ The Bush administration responded by creating the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by Secre- tary of State Colin Powell. Published just before the nominating conventions in mid-2004, the commission’s report recommended that President Bush tighten the embargo by reducing family visits and restricting remittances. These reduc- tions and restrictions were not popular with many Cuban Americans, but they solidiﬁed the president’s ultra-hard-line Cuban American base and probably contributed to his win in Florida.

Both George Bush and Barack Obama understood the importance of Flor- ida’s Cuban Americans, and both candidates’ campaigns were guided by astute pollsters who in 2004 advised Bush to tighten the embargo but in 2008 advised Obama to relax it. The Democrats could not hope to attract the Republicans’ hard-line base, but their polling indicted that a moderate Cuba policy was no longer an electoral death sentence among Cuban Americans. And the candi- date’s stand on Cuba was also important to many of the liberal Democrats who form that party’s base. Walking an exceptionally thin line, Barack Obama promised to maintain the embargo but to lighten up on family visits and remit- tances. And he won Florida.

So where is U.S. policy heading? Given the torpor that has followed the Obama administration’s April 2009 relaxation of restrictions on Cuban Ameri- cans, a safe hypothesis for the near term is that we may be heading toward a few more modest steps, albeit not to the full normalization of relations. But today’s aging generation of Cuban revolutionaries and Cuban American counterrevo- lutionaries is clearly fading into the sunset. In time, the next generation of Cuban leaders will make changes on the island, and assessments of those changes by the next generation of Cuban Americans will slowly diversify. At some point, the pollsters will tell everyone it is safe to end the estrangement.

The truly interesting question is what might come after that. No one knows, of course, but it may be instructive to look at a somewhat similar situation that occurred in the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union disappeared and when Cuba no longer had the resources to promote revolution abroad, especially in Central America, which had been one of Washington’s consuming concerns throughout the 1980s. With national security interests no longer part of the policy debate, a reporter asked the ﬁrst President Bush in 1991 if he intended to engage Fidel Castro as he had engaged Mikhail Gorbachev. ‘‘What’s the point?’’ he replied. ‘‘All I’d tell him is what I’m telling you, to give the people the freedom that they want. And then you’ll see the United States do exactly what we should: Go down and lift those people up.’’10

We should not make too much of this off-the-cuff response, but it suggests that something more than three pedestrian interests—security, economics, and domestic politics—underlies U.S. policy. It suggests the existence of a peculiar mind-set, a way of thinking about Cuba that may point to the direction of U.S. policy in the years immediately ahead. The foundation of this uplifting mind- set is an obvious power disparity: the United States, unlike Cuba, is wealthy, and it has used a substantial portion of its wealth to create the most powerful military in the history of the human race. That raw power, in turn, has given politicians such as Richard Nixon the ability to tell voters that ‘‘the United States has the power, and Mr. Castro knows this, to throw him out of ofﬁce,’’ and it has given cabinet members such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig the ability to ask President Ronald Reagan for a simple green light: what he said to the President, according to Nancy Reagan, is: ‘‘You just give me the word and I’ll turn that f—— island into a parking lot.’’11

What would seem puzzling to a visitor from another planet is why, when the Cubans refused to behave as Washington insisted, their leaders were not thrown out of ofﬁce and their island was not turned into a parking lot. How have they managed to get away with it? There are several answers. Initially, Cuba balanced U.S. power by enlisting the support of a rival superpower, but that answer takes us only to about 1990, when the Soviet Union withdrew its support. Since then, much of Washington’s forbearance can be attributed to the fact that no one has much time or political capital to spend on any Caribbean island. A simple list of all the other issues confronting senior ofﬁcials is sufﬁ- cient to explain why Nixon largely ignored Cuba when he ﬁnally claimed the presidency, why Reagan declined to endorse Haig’s parking-lot solution, and why presidential adviser Arthur Schlesinger Jr. had this to say about the one president who seemed to spend more time than any other on Cuba: ‘‘Castro was not a major issue for Kennedy, who had much else on his mind.’’12

And this combination of awesome power and globe-girding responsibili- ties helps explain why, once Eisenhower- and Kennedy-era leaders had decided to overthrow the island’s revolutionary government, they planned to do it on the cheap, with a covert operation that, like the overthrow of Guatemala’s left- leaning Jacobo Árbenz government in 1954, would take only a couple of days. The CIA predicted a cakewalk, telling Kennedy that ‘‘less than 30 percent of the population is still with Fidel,’’ and ‘‘in this 30 percent are included the negroes, who will not ﬁght.’’13 Then three months later, when Kennedy admin- istration ofﬁcials discovered at the Bay of Pigs that the Cubans would ﬁght back, they had to decide what to do next. Certainly Cubans could be subdued, but not by a couple of thousand exiles; Washington would have to use the Marines, who might have to turn the island into a parking lot. Imagine what that would cost in the currency that might matter most: world opinion.

So what was plan B? First, there were a few years of what we today would call state-sponsored terrorism—Operation Mongoose, which focused on sabo- taging power plants, torching sugar ﬁelds, and arming assassins. But when that low-cost covert activity proved unsuccessful, the consensus opinion was that Cuba was not sufﬁciently important to require costly, decisive action. What happened is that Lyndon Johnson, inexperienced in foreign affairs, waited only a few days after inheriting the White House to seek advice from the widely respected chair of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J. William Fulbright. In their telephone conversation, Fulbright began to warn against anything dramatic but had barely completed a sentence before the new presi- dent interrupted to agree: ‘‘I’m not getting into any Bay of Pigs deal. No, I’m just asking you what we ought to do to pinch their nuts more than we’re doing.’’14

Nut pinching—an embargo—has been U.S. policy ever since. During the Kennedy era, ‘‘I used to get a call from McGeorge Bundy or one of his assis- tants every day about something,’’ recalled the State Department’s principal Cuba ofﬁcer; but ‘‘under Johnson, the calls dropped down to probably once a week, and then maybe once every two weeks or once a month.’’15 Why? Be- cause even a superpower has limited resources, and President Johnson, like every one of his successors, had better ways to spend his political capital. Instead of ramping up Operation Mongoose, Johnson initially chose to focus on domestic issues—a month after consulting with Fulbright, he went before a joint session of Congress to declare the War on Poverty and to press for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Completely absorbed in pursuing these domes- tic initiatives, he had little time for Cuba, especially as his administration’s foreign policy eyes began to focus on Indochina. Soon, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy was encouraging everyone to face reality. ‘‘The chances are very good that we will still be living with Castro some time from now,’’ he said; ‘‘we might just as well get used to the idea.’’16

But tugging U.S. policy toward greater involvement is domestic politics— Cuban American votes—augmented by a ﬁrmly established conviction that the United States is responsible for taking care of Cuba or, as the ﬁrst President Bush told that reporter in 1991, if Fidel Castro would relax his grip on power, ‘‘then you’ll see the United States do exactly what we should: Go down and lift those people up.’’ This idea was close to what candidate Barack Obama told his Cuban American campaign audience in May 2008: the embargo had to be retained as leverage because ‘‘the United States must be a relentless advocate for democracy.’’17 So far, Obama has given Cuba almost none of his attention, but at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, he repeated his campaign-trail commitment, emphasizing that ‘‘the Cuban people are not free. And that’s our lodestone, our North Star, when it comes to our policy in Cuba.’’ Like its predecessor, the Obama administration is committed to uplifting Cuba.

Like the two post–Cold War presidents sandwiched between them—Bill Clinton and George W. Bush—both the ﬁrst President Bush and President Obama were simply continuing a century-old tradition of uplifting, which has now become a controlling component of Washington’s Cuba ideology. The origin of this uplifting tradition can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century, a time of rapid U.S. territorial expansion. But let us not expand southward, argued one member of the House of Representatives, reacting to a proposal that the United States purchase the island from Spain. His winning argument was, ‘‘We have enough of inferior races in our midst without absorbing and not assimilating the Creoles and blacks of Cuba.’’18 The consensus at the time, in 1869, was that the outright incorporation of Cuba would harm rather than help the United States. But some uplifting could still occur, wrote the U.S. consul in Havana a few years later, urging a reduction of trade barriers so that American merchants could ‘‘extend to the country and its inhabitants the advantages of contact with the higher civiliza- tion, the greater energy, the purer morality of America.’’19

Today’s uplifting effort, which focuses on promoting democracy, carries on a tradition established immediately after the Spanish-American War in the late nineteenth century. The congressional resolution authorizing the war said nothing about the type of government to be established in Cuba once the Spanish had been ousted, but self-rule was explicit in the war resolution’s promise that the United States would ‘‘leave the government and control of the island to its people’’—the demos. This suggested a democracy, but creating one was easier said than done. ‘‘We are going ahead as fast as we can,’’ Governor- General Leonard Wood wrote President William McKinley in 1900, more than a year after the war ended, ‘‘but we are dealing with a race that has steadily been going down for a hundred years into which we have got to infuse new life, new principles and new methods of doing things. This is not the work of a day or of a year, but of a longer period.’’20

Wood’s letter arrived in Washington at a moment when McKinley’s thoughts were on domestic politics—reelection—and when the rival Demo- crats were already making political capital out of his administration’s inability to pacify the Philippines, another part of the spoils seized from Spain. Seeking to balance that quagmire with progress in Cuba, the president ordered Wood to draw up the ﬁrst U.S. plan for Cuba’s democracy.

Wood did so. It began with the disenfranchisement of that part of the Cuban population that had gone furthest downhill. Suffrage was restricted to Cuban- born males over the age of twenty who could meet one of three requirements: the ability to read and write, the possession of property valued at $250 or more, or military service in the insurgent forces before the U.S. intervention. These restrictions eliminated two-thirds of Cuba’s adult males, and Secretary of War Elihu Root was especially pleased to see that ‘‘whites so greatly outnumber the blacks’’ in the electorate: ‘‘When the history of the new Cuba comes to be written the establishment of popular self-government, based on a limited suf- frage, excluding so great a proportion of the elements which have brought ruin to Hayti and San Domingo, will be regarded as an event of ﬁrst importance.’’21

But then, when given their opportunity to vote—for Cuba’s ﬁrst constitu- ent assembly—Cubans elected the wrong individuals. ‘‘The dominant party in the Convention to-day contains probably the worst political element in the Island,’’ Wood reported. Because this was the body that would write Cuba’s ﬁrst constitution, and because the U.S. election was over, Wood’s ﬁrst reaction was to press for a delay, promising ‘‘that at the next municipal elections we shall get hold of a better class of people.’’ He also reopened the issue of keeping the island, citing the concerns of local property owners who, he reported, ‘‘are very reluctant to see a change of government, unless it be annexation to the United States.’’22

But the Republicans had made an unambiguous campaign commitment to Cuban independence, and so they turned to their fallback position—the Platt Amendment, named after Connecticut Senator Orville Platt, chair of the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, who worried that Cubans were too juvenile for complete independence: ‘‘In many ways they are like children.’’23 Platt’s 1901 amendment to the army appropriations bill prohibited the withdrawal of U.S. troops until Cubans had amended their new constitution to authorize the United States the right to intervene for ‘‘the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty.’’24 Once Cubans had agreed—they were told they had no choice if they wanted their independence—Wood handed over power to Tomás Estrada Palma, a natural- ized U.S. citizen who had lived in the United States for three decades. Uncon- tested on the ballot, he won Cuba’s ﬁrst U.S.-supervised presidential election without leaving his home in upstate New York. Estrada Palma’s election ended Washington’s ﬁrst effort to promote democracy in Cuba.

A second effort began four years later, in 1906, when a substantial number of Cubans rebelled in response to that year’s fraudulent election. ‘‘I am so angry with that infernal little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe its people off the face of the earth,’’ an exasperated President Theodore Roosevelt conﬁded to a friend. ‘‘All we have wanted from them was that they would behave themselves and be prosperous and happy so that we would not have to interfere. And now, lo and behold, they have started an utterly unjustiﬁable and pointless revolution.’’ Roosevelt invoked the Platt Amendment, and U.S. forces took over the island once again. Asked to explain his purpose, the president told to a Harvard audience, ‘‘I am doing my best to persuade the Cubans that if only they will be good they will be happy. I am seeking the very minimum of interference necessary to make them good.’’

Forced to the defensive after retaking a country only recently granted its independence, Roosevelt’s provisional governor of Cuba, Secretary of War William Howard Taft, reminded readers of National Geographic that ‘‘the record of the nine years since the beginning of the Spanish War, looked at from an impartial standpoint, is on the whole an unblemished record of generous, earnest effort to uplift these people’’; and he said the same thing directly to Cubans: ‘‘We are here only to help you . . . with our arm under your arm, lifting you again on the path of wonderful progress.’’ And he continued in the manner of a caring Dutch uncle to an audience celebrating the reopening day of the University of Havana: ‘‘perhaps you will pardon me if I invite your attention, as an educated and intelligent audience, to some of the difﬁculties of your peo- ple.’’ These difﬁculties were many, but the most signiﬁcant problem was that ‘‘the young Cubans who are coming forward into life are not sufﬁciently in- fused with the mercantile spirit.’’ To Taft, it boiled down to a simple thing: ‘‘What you need here among the Cubans is a desire to make money.’’25

As did Leonard Wood before him, Taft understood that the uplifting would not be easy. He told Roosevelt that the insurrection ‘‘could not have occurred in a country in which the common and ignorant people are not as easily aroused’’; he wrote his wife that ‘‘the whole thing demonstrates the utter unﬁttness of these people for self govt.’’ Nonetheless, this second U.S. intervention was also in- tended to be brief—Roosevelt instructed the War Department, ‘‘Our business is to establish peace and order on a satisfactory basis, start the new government, and then leave the island.’’26 These instructions were handed to a new governor- general, Charles Magoon, who agreed that Cuba’s ﬁery culture was the underly- ing problem: ‘‘Like all other people of Spanish origin they are hot blooded, high strung, nervous, excitable and pessimistic.’’ Uplifting would therefore be slow, for ‘‘we cannot change these racial characteristics by administering their Gov- ernment for two years or twenty years.’’27

As an alternative to a time-consuming attempt to de-Hispanicize Cuban culture, Magoon tried to constrain the excitable Cubans by strengthening their institutions. He created the Advisory Law Commission composed of nine care- fully chosen Cubans and three U.S. citizens, and chaired by Colonel Enoch Crowder, an army attorney; it prepared an array of administrative reforms, including a thoroughly revised electoral code that expanded suffrage to nearly all adult males and established proportional representation to encourage the loyal participation of minority parties. Magoon then supervised a clean elec- tion, and in early 1909, he sailed for home.

Although U.S. forces returned in 1912 to quash a complex Afro-Cuban labor dispute in eastern Cuba, it was not until several years later that the United States launched its third effort to promote democracy in Cuba. It began during the Wilson administration, which still today is the record holder for Caribbean Basin interventions. President Wilson is said to have characterized his policy as an effort ‘‘to teach the South American Republics to elect good men,’’ and before Cuba, he had already ordered the invasions of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Panama. All of these nearby countries were fortunate, argued Wilson’s assistant secretary of state, who noted in 1916 that ‘‘nature, in its rough method of uplift, gives sick nations strong neighbors.’’ Three months later, the United States sent several hundred soldiers to maintain order around U.S.-owned sugar estates in central Cuba, where they stayed for ﬁve years.28

It was during this partial occupation that the Wilson administration pres- sured President Mario García Menocal to invite Enoch Crowder to take another crack at improving Cuba’s democracy; it also sent a new uplift-oriented ambas- sador, Boaz Long, who believed that ‘‘extending our inﬂuences over these less favored people with the idea of educating them and regulating and improving their agricultural and commercial development, and making them good citizens of a democracy, involves a colossal task, but one not unworthy of an enlight- ened American policy.’’ Acting Secretary of State Frank Polk warned Cubans that more troops would be sent unless ‘‘President Menocal assumes a receptive attitude in respect to the advice and just recommendations which the President has instructed General Crowder to convey to him.’’29

Two days later, Crowder sailed into Havana’s harbor aboard a battleship, the USS Minnesota, which would serve as his home for a year. Because he was already familiar with the island, Crowder wasted no time before producing a stream of memoranda directing García Menocal and his successor, Alfredo Zayas, to enact essential reforms. Memorandum 8 demanded ‘‘the immediate removal from ofﬁce of every ofﬁcial who . . . ,’’ and then follow seven separate categories of behavior indicative of ‘‘Graft, Corruption and Immorality in the Public Administration.’’ Memorandum 10 required ‘‘an immediate reform of the Lottery which is the source of widespread graft.’’30 This type of uplifting is inherently slow, but by 1926, the State Department felt sufﬁciently satisﬁed with Cuba and the series of other Caribbean interventions to pause for a ‘‘mis- sion accomplished’’ moment: ‘‘If the United States has received but little gratitude, this is only to be expected in a world where gratitude is rarely accorded to the teacher, the doctor, or the policeman, and we have been all three. But it may be that in time they will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something of the respect and affection with which a man regards the instructor of his youth and the child looks upon the parent who has molded his character.’’ Two years later, when the Senate began debating how to handle equally obstreperous Nicaragua, Senator William Bruce asked his colleagues to ‘‘think of our intervention in Cuba. This is absolutely one of the ﬁnest things in human history.’’31

#### Problematizing the way we formulate policy in academic debate is critical to challenge the current ideology and change political thought about Latin America

Bertucci 13 – (Mariano, Political Science and International Relations Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern California, “Latin America Has Moved On: U.S. Scholarship Hasn’t”, Americas Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 2, Spring)

The bias in U.S. research on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America not only skews analysis and understanding of the region, it also sidesteps today's greatest challenges. The study of what scholars focus on and debate helps to shape how policy is understood and discussed in the public realm and, sometimes, even made. However, a close look at the past three decades of scholarly publications on U.S.-Latin American relations, covering 174 peer-reviewed articles and 167 non-edited books, reveals a disconnect with many of the themes and realities in the region today. International relations or other fields of inquiry related to global studies, such as international political economy or security, are severely underrepresented in scholarship on the Western Hemisphere. Instead, most of the research in the field is based on the study of foreign policy. Over 94 percent of the scholarly publications noted above that are dedicated to the region could be qualified as foreign policy analyses rather than the more current or trendy themes of international relations theory or international political economy. And within foreign policy studies, it is essentially the study of the U.S. foreign policy-making process. Virtually all (89 percent) scholarly works offering foreign policy analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations make U.S. foreign policy a central focus in their understanding of U.S.-Latin American affairs. Roughly half of the articles and books (51 percent) focus on foreign policy initiatives and reactions of the U.S. and Latin American countries toward one another; and almost 40 percent of published works only analyze U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America. As a direct consequence of this approach, there is almost no attention paid to international political economy or security. And that, in turn, has led to a neglect of some of the most central and challenging issues in today's policy agenda: narcotics trafficking, migration, the environment, and energy cooperation. Alongside the U.S.-centic understanding of Latin America, there are relatively few policy articles and books on foreign policies of Caribbean countries, on South American countries-including, most notably, Brazil- and even on Mexico's policies toward the United States. As a result, there are serious gaps in our understanding of how much latitude nation-states in the Americas have to set their own policy, especially in a region in which U.S. influence is becoming more diffuse. Other gaps concern the migration, drug-related, and energy security issues and threats faced by the United States. These problems are likely to be solved only through sustained cooperative efforts with countries such as Mexico and Brazil. But these countries' foreign policies toward the U.S. are under studied. Only 12.9 percent of all articles and books focus on U.S.-Mexico relations and less than 3 percent focus on Mexico's foreign policy toward the United States. Similarly, less than 5 percent of articles and books analyze U.S.-Brazil relations and no more than 2 percent examine Brazil's foreign policy toward the "Colossus of the North." These are critical gaps. Any informed foreign policy must be based on an understanding of both sides. Differences in Understanding The deficiencies-even biases-of current research on U.S.-Latin American relations become even more apparent when peer-reviewed publications of U.S.-based scholars are compared to those of scholars based in Latin America. U.S.- based scholars address the foreign policies of Latin American countries in just 3.1 percent of their publications, but 87 percent of their works put the U.S. at the center of the analysis. Meanwhile, U.S.-Latin American foreign policy interactions are addressed in only one-third of their publications. The implication of this pattern is clear: the literature leaves one with the impression that "U.S.-Latin American relations" is synonymous with "U.S. policy." This distortion in research and the literature can have practical and policy impacts. Most significantly, it has contributed to the conventional wisdom that the best way to make sense of U.S.-Latin American relations is to understand, first and foremost, the U.S. foreign policy- making process. That, however, only delivers truncated pictures of the factors shaping the hemisphere historically and, especially, today. To be sure, policy doesn't automatically follow from scholarly publications. Still, research-based ideas do trickle down through the work of think tanks, op-eds, policy journals, and other venues. Scholars do participate in government-either as consultants or as appointees- and policymakers have been exposed to research at some point in their professional development. Almost three decades of a U.S.-centered perspective on Latin America is likely to shape a very particular worldview on the policy issues at hand. From there, it's a short step to hegemonic conceptions of U.S.-Latin American relations, particularly when combined with the predominance in policy circles of an untested theoretical model in which the U.S. is the actor and Latin American countries the dependent and defenseless objects. Research by scholars based in Latin America appears somewhat more balanced but no less parochial than that of their U.S. colleagues. In their studies of U.S.-Latin American relations, Latin American scholars put their own countries' foreign policies center stage in 71 percent of publications. They address U.S.-Latin American foreign interactions in roughly half of their work, but consider U.S. foreign policy toward the region to be the more salient focus of their analyses in 16 percent of their articles. Similar patterns appear when you compare scholarship in the U.S. to scholarship from Latin America in matters of international political economy. Economic integration and regionalism are only addressed in less than 10 percent of journal publications by U.S.-based scholars; however, these same issues are the focus of almost 40 percent of the journal articles published by Latin American scholars. As a result, integration efforts (e.g. ,the Free Trade Area of the Americas, Mercosur, ftaa- Mercosur interactions, and nafta) that have been front and center in shaping Latin American policy are given short shriftin U.S.-based research and scholarship. The difference-and its implications for how scholars and policymakers on both sides of the Rio Grande view the world and the region-will only become more stark as the trend toward sub-regional integration through institutions like celac and unasur increases. Moreover, where much of the Latin American policy debates since the early 1990s focused on convergence, typical international relations (IR) specialists would have tended to look at individual interests of countries and the trend toward divergence unless there were common interests at stake. Even though developments in migration, energy security and drug-related violence confirm the intermestic nature (i.e., the interplay of international and domestic politics) of the current U.S.-Latin American relationship, research patterns show that the stock of knowledge available to policymakers working on any such issues is marginal. Only 16 percent of articles and books on U.S.-Latin American relations focus on the environment, migration and narcotics. Furthermore, some intermestic issues, such as remittances, energy supply and public health, are almost completely ignored. A similar pattern is evident in relation to exploring the role of non-state actors in U.S.-Latin American relations. Multinational enterprises, religious and guerrilla organizations, among others, have all presumably had a significant impact on hemispheric affairs. Yet only 6 percent of the scholarly work published on U.S.- Latin American relations over the past quarter century has paid attention to such non-state actors, rendering their role in hemispheric affairs a matter of speculation. Moreover, the recent literature almost completely disregards more traditional security issues, such as deterrence of extra-hemispheric powers and risks of nuclear proliferation and war. Getting Over Our Yanqui Foreign Policy Obsession Apart from the regional differences in terms of research perspectives, research patterns in U.S.-Latin American affairs more generally diverge from trends in the broader field of international relations, in which foreign policy analysis is marginal compared to the attention devoted to international political economy, security issues and international relations theory. The differences demonstrate that little intellectual dialogue and sharing is taking place among international relations scholars and U.S.-Latin American relations specialists. Rectifying this situation would require IR scholars to explain, test and, when necessary, develop new theories on the causes and interests surrounding the pressing policy issues in the hemisphere. Many of these issues also lend themselves to quantitative analyses now dominant in IR. Statistical measures can help assess levels, degrees and dimensions of asymmetries between countries on both sides of the Rio Grande. Game theory can specify the terms, conditions and extent of compliance with (or defection from) multilateral schemes. And Bayesian algebra can help identify the conditions promoting cooperation or defection. But all this is easier said than done. As of 2013, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA)-the largest professional association for individuals and institutions studying Latin America-does not have a section on international relations (although, as of 2011, it does offer an award for the best book published on the region's foreign policy and international affairs). Funding opportunities for researching the hemisphere's international politics are relatively scarce, particularly for young IR scholars. Also, the current reputational pecking order in the field of international relations hardly rewards regional expertise. This is particularly true in the U.S. and increasingly so in other countries. Even if some scholars are willing to do some soulsearching of their own and embrace the mindset, tools and research goals of IR in their analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations, such efforts are not likely to be enough to systematically yield more balanced, practical and IR-minded approaches to inter-American affairs. Governments, think tanks, university-based research centers, and foundations throughout the hemisphere also need to be involved by helping to redefine and build new institutional supports for producing research that is both peer-reviewed and policy-relevant. More foundations, think tanks and research grants need to also place a higher priority on producing peerreviewed IR research on the pressing issues in the hemisphere. As the leading professional association, LASA needs to encourage and support the creation of a section on international relations that could bring together the work of both senior and young IR scholars around a U.S.-Latin American relations policy-driven research agenda. Governments should also help fund training and research on those same policy issues in top IR research programs. The creation of a peer-reviewed outlet with the mission of publishing theory-based and methodologically rigorous research on the intermestic dimensions of narcotrafficking, energy security and organized crime, to name just a few hot policy examples, would be an important addition to the relatively limited number of outlets available to publish research on inter-American politics and economics. Only from such platforms can innovative new research contribute sustainably to the shaping of common solutions to the shared problems in the hemisphere.

#### **Economic sanctions are a form of economic terrorism which makes colonialism an ever present fact in the lives of Cubans – the justifications of ending communism are shoddy and excuses for endless intervention and violence**

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The economic sanctions imposed on Cuba by the United States are unique in view of their longevity and of their complexity but they are consistent with the real objectives of the first world power. In order to show this, it is necessary to base this analysis on the following postulate: the blockade is part of a scheme designed not to promote democratic values, as the administration in Washington would have us believe, but to control the natural resources of Third World nations through subjugation. And the history of the United States ­ characterized mainly by violent and bloody conquest of new territories ­ proves this unequivocally.

As far back as the middle of the 19th century, U.S. expansionist William Gilpin announced: "The destiny of the American people is to subdue the continent." The primary goal of the United States is to make sure that the resources of the countries of the South remain at hand of the capital of the masters of the universe. The case of Cuba is exceptional because it is the only country that has dared to refuse to follow the orders set by their northern neighbor, designing its political, economic and social system, at once sovereign and independent, despite the unilateral constraints imposed by Washington. The enmity Cuba is a victim of reflects a historical continuity whose broad lines must be retraced. And by the way, it would be widely-known if something like a sense of respect for obvious historical truisms existed. This topic would not be controversial if the society we live in was intellectually free.

#### These attempts to dominate a target nation is based in a form of power politics that generates violence – it must be rejected

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Critical Redefinition of Power in the International Arena The critical redefinition of power that would be involved in a feminist epistemology of international relations would also critique sanctions. Sanctions entrench the concept of power-over, for example, the United States’ power over the government and people of Syria to force them to comply with the United States’ wishes. Saddam Hussein’s response to the sanctions is also typical of a traditional understanding of power, as the response to an attempt at coercion is to resist it at all costs, even if that means injury to the citizens within Iraq. While proponents of sanctions talk of them as persuasion and leverage, their opponents describe sanctions as a weapon used by the dominant intended to force the compliance of the subordinate. There is a literature that encourages sanctions encourages shunning of many sanctioned governments as an ethical statement76, that is, cut off communication as a punishment for the government’s misdeeds. This sort of rhetoric entrenches normative power relations, and allows no space of a transition of power to the ideas of acting in concert as opposed to coercion. The feminist international relations viewpoint would see all nations and people as fundamentally equal. In their equality, nations would not have the ability to exert power over one another in judgment. Simply put, the United States does not have the right to bind other nations by its ethics, as the only way it can do so is its power of its dominance. This viewpoint should not been seen as complicit in or endorsing of the human rights violations that Saddam Hussein inflicts on the people of Iraq, or of The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military threats towards its neighbors, or of any nation’s state-sponsored terrorism. At the same time, the viewpoint recognizes that there are many violences and tragedies in the international relations arena that the United States has been either complicit or involved in, including but not limited to the humanitarian effects of economic sanctions. The “he started it” argument about the ethical excusability sanctions might have been effective ten years ago, but has lost its weight, as the many nations’ position on the international norms that sanctions attempt to enforce have not changed. Feminism here does not refrain from behavioral criticism, but rejects enforcement of one person or entity’s opinion on a subject via the power-over sort of policy that sanctions is. Like the power-over concept, sanctions are inherently conflict-based. It has been clear from the United States’ behavior concerning the sanctions that compromise is not an option, and that the sanctions’ game is a winner-takes-all fight. Take up the example of Iraq once again. The United States is not going to lift sanctions unless Iraq cooperates with United Nations’ weapons inspections in which the United States is involved; Iraq is not going to cooperate with weapons inspections if the United States is involved in any way. Compromising that has gone on has been minimal, and not really affected the humanitarian effects of sanctions. The oil-for-food program is an example. It maintained the United States’ absolute power-over attitude, as the rules were that Iraq could see oil and purchase food if and only if the United Nations could supervise every transaction and set a limit on the amount of money that was transacted. This would allow the United States to maintain control over the Iraqi economy completely. Also, for various reasons, the oil-for-food program didn’t work. Iraq no longer had, and was not allowed to import, the infrastructure to get the oil out of the ground; and thus could not meet the United Nations’ quotas to sell the oil.77 Also, Iraq had difficulty trading the money for the supplies that were needed because the United States dictated what was allowed under the agreement and not. Finally, oil- for-food did not allow individual citizens to trade with other nations, only the government of Iraq. As we have already been over, the government of Iraq is not the most liberal of institutions, and supplies did not reach all of the people. Sanctions put Iraqis in a little cage, and the oil-for-food program kept them there, just dangling a carrot just out of reach.

#### The embargo upholds an approach to international relations based on hypocrisy and enemy creation – it sacrifices the population on the altar of revolution

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For years American political leaders and media were fond of labeling Cuba an “international pariah”. We haven’t heard that for a very long time. Perhaps one reason is the annual vote in the United Nations General Assembly on the resolution which reads: “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba”. This is how the vote has gone (not including abstentions):

Year Votes (Yes-No) No Votes

1992 59-2 US, Israel 1993 88-4 US, Israel, Albania, Paraguay

1994 101-2 US, Israel 1995 117-3 US, Israel, Uzbekistan

1996 138-3 US, Israel, Uzbekistan

1997 143-3 US, Israel, Uzbekistan

1998 157-2 US, Israel

1999 155-2 US, Israel

2000 167-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands

2001 167-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands 2002 173-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands

2003 179-3 US, Israel, Marshall Islands

2004 179-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2005 182-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2006 183-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2007 184-4 US, Israel, Marshall Islands, Palau

2008 185-3 US, Israel, Palau

2009 187-3 US, Israel, Palau

2010 187-2 US, Israel

2011 186-2 US, Israel

2012 188-3 US, Israel, Palau

2013 188-2 US, Israel

Each fall the UN vote is a welcome reminder that the world has not completely lost its senses and that the American empire does not completely control the opinion of other governments.

Speaking before the General Assembly, October 29, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez declared: “The economic damages accumulated after half a century as a result of the implementation of the blockade amount to $1.126 trillion.” He added that the blockade “has been further tightened under President Obama’s administration”, some 30 US and foreign entities being hit with $2.446 billion in fines due to their interaction with Cuba.

However, the American envoy, Ronald Godard, in an appeal to other countries to oppose the resolution, said:

“The international community … cannot in good conscience ignore the ease and frequency with which the Cuban regime silences critics, disrupts peaceful assembly, impedes independent journalism and, despite positive reforms, continues to prevent some Cubans from leaving or returning to the island. The Cuban government continues its tactics of politically motivated detentions, harassment and police violence against Cuban citizens.”[1]

So there you have it. That is why Cuba must be punished. One can only guess what Mr. Godard would respond if told that more than 7,000 people were arrested in the United States during the Occupy Movement’s first 8 months of protest;[2] that their encampments were violently smashed up; that many of them were physically abused by the police.

Does Mr. Godard ever read a newspaper or the Internet, or watch television? Hardly a day passes in America without a police officer shooting to death an unarmed person?

As to “independent journalism” – what would happen if Cuba announced that from now on anyone in the country could own any kind of media? How long would it be before CIA money – secret and unlimited CIA money financing all kinds of fronts in Cuba – would own or control most of the media worth owning or controlling?

The real reason for Washington’s eternal hostility toward Cuba? The fear of a good example of an alternative to the capitalist model; a fear that has been validated repeatedly over the years as Third World countries have expressed their adulation of Cuba.

How the embargo began: On April 6, 1960, Lester D. Mallory, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, wrote in an internal memorandum: “The majority of Cubans support Castro … The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship. … every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba.” Mallory proposed “a line of action which … makes the greatest inroads in denying money and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.”[3] Later that year, the Eisenhower administration instituted the suffocating embargo against its everlasting enemy.

#### It’s try or die – security’s epistemological precepts attempt to render everything knowable and hence predictable – this means that random variation in IR ensures aggression and enemy creation which makes extinction inevitable

Burke 07 – Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeperbedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the realitself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity:ontologies,statements about truth and being which claim a rarefied **privilege** to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is.

I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form.

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemonyandclosure that limits debateand questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is **grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quickentheresort to warand to lead to itsescalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it **permeates being**.

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain anddestruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21

What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action.

The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political.

Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State

In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28

The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness':

Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30

Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist:

Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33

Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition:

the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35

Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36

When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification.

This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes anunacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) Thiseffaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. Weignore the complex history of a conflict**,** and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action.

Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues that:

...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39

Identity, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians.

On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples:

When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42

Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44

The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46

The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48

Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues,

the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50

Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state:

The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52

A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state.

Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth

By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features.

These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55

Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56

At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony:

For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58

Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said:

...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62

This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65

Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66

Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68

We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam:

For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69

There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70

And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation.

Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology

If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed:

...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71

By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture:

We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72

Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment nowthreatened its total andabsolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon.

Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75

Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good.

Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth.

Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77

This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind **demands that 'nature reports itself** in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.

This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81

Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices?

I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82

In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discoursesof scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being**.** Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer anddie. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90

This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### We have reached a moment of crisis – the USFG has been co-opted by the language of the survival society where government officials maintain an atmosphere of fear to pass imperial policies – this orients society towards permanent war and evacuates critical public spheres such as debate which eviscerates agency – simulating USFG action without evaluating the securitized bedrock upon which our government formulates foreign policy makes violence inevitable

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Throughout the media discourse over the virtues or moral failings of the policy analysis markets, broader questions about the possibility of individuals ‘knowing’ anything new was never addressed. The problem of citizens producing ‘accurate’ information under the social conditions of consolidated media implicated with defense contractors is clearly problematic. With the dominant US news media issuing a series of mea culpa explanations for their failure to investigate governmental claims about WMD and Iraq Al Qaeda connections leading up the start of the Iraq war, coupled with scandals about forged documents, non-investigative journalism and a US, presidential election campaign dominated by discussion of television ads over social issues, the possibility of a well informed electorate making accurate forecasts of terrorist activity was unlikely and rather circular people betting on possible events based on information disseminated from the government seeking insights from the general public. Nevertheless, proponents of PAM assailed the critics for injecting morality into an amoral (sic) process. What we are left with is a call to embrace a market system that is driven, not by rational judgment and intelligence, but rather fueled by the emotion of fear. Morality, dissent, criticism and analytical thought must be evacuated for the market to perform smoothly. Citizens turned gamblers take part in homeland (in)security by wagering money on potential terror outcomes, based on information provided by a media that reproduces government allegation as fact. As we saw in the height of the Wall Street Technology insider driven bubble of the late 1990s, there was no need for analysis of a businesses balance sheet, it could be assumed that a ‘new economy’ had emerged. Decisions were made based on an inevitable future where evidence and balance sheets were replaced by optimism. Conversely, with PAM the market is driven by pessimism, the fear of what will happen. Conclusion In the lead up to the presidential election of 2004, the Bush Administration repeatedly defended the strategy of preemption and the actions taken against Iraq with statements that ‘the world is safer’. This rhetorical turn exemplifies the language of the survival society, where statements about national security require little to no proof or evidence. Most Americans have no way to either refute or to affirm the central question raised: are we safer? Indeed in the face of so many troubling questions and such fearful uncertainties, facts fall by the wayside. Thus, in many respects the survivor society is sustained by a suspension of disbelief. Morality, critical thinking and dissent actively inhibit the smooth functioning of society. As inevitability becomes the dominant trope, individual agency is redirected toward survival, a hyper individualism that evacuates the possibility of critical exchange in the public sphere. Critical exchanges, dissent, hindsight and re-evaluation are said to support the enemy and undermine the preemptive efforts. Citizens are called upon to continue shopping and maintain ‘normal’ behavior because to do anything less would disrupt the flow of consumer goods and services and weaken a fragile economy. Theoretically we need to continue to question how surveillance functions in an environment where evidence is not needed to justify state violence, arrests, incarceration, etc. (America’s pre-emptive policy at home and abroad). We’ve characterized this as shift in reasoning, from ‘what-if’ simulation models where surveillance intelligence fuels forecasting models, to ‘when, then’ thinking where the future is deemed inevitable (i.e. ‘not if but when terrorists will attack’). The RAND and DARPA terrorist preparation programs and terrorist futures market examples demonstrate that’when, then’ reasoning is not as much about tracking and monitoring behaviour as it is evacuating the possibility of social critique and political debate. According to DARPA and other ‘betting’ proponents, rational thought and ethical questions about the market disable their predictive powers. Thus, in the survivor society social control is achieved through distancing the need for evidence and installing forecasting technologies that by their very nature must function critique-free. The discursive contours of the survivor society offer stark contrasts to those of the Cold War era and the emerging surveillance society. During World War II, the US government implored citizens to sacrifice for the collective good, initiating everything from recycling programs to gardening as a way to conserve resources and boost food production. Victory gardens became a symbol of civic participation, where individual actions were directed toward a collective good. These programs were materially based and discursively centered around active participation in the war effort. Alternatively, the war on terror has elicited calls for a hyper-individualism that focuses on the immaterial faith, wagering and the primacy of individual survival. Civic participation is equated with maintaining (or increasing) consumer debt, participating in the privatized ‘marketplace of ideas’ futures markets and avoiding any temptation to inject morality, dissent, criticism or analytical thought lest they aid and abet the enemy and interfere with the smooth functioning of predictive markets. This new rhetoric of the survivor society is amplified through an increasingly monolithic commercial televisual media system. Although policy documents offer more nuanced predictions about the war on terror, public statements by a host of government officials, broadcast repeatedly as sound bites, describe a stark, inevitable future of unending terror threats. The contradictions between the written documents and the public statements suggest a willful attempt to harness the immediacy (and uniformity) of network and cable news outlets to distribute and maintain an atmosphere of fear and emotion that encourages participation in the new regimes of hyper individualism. For those who resist these new regimes, choosing to dissent, ask for evidence, or request public documents, their actions are met with increased hostility and accusations of irrationality. Moreover, the foundational concept of preemption, predicated on an inevitable future that must be intervened, undermines the possibility of dissent. If a future is inevitable, to question that future is to question reality a mark of irrationality or worse. Debate, deliberation and reflection are by-passed by a discourse of inevitability, leaving dissent among the ranks of the delusional. Thus the new victory garden grows from the seeds of fear, fed by emotion, and harvested as a fragmented populace devoid of transparency are cut out of the democratic process. Members of the survivor society are asked to prepare themselves (as individuals) through a series of purchases and by remaining vigilant, all without any request for collective sacrifice or coordination. The neo-liberal model becomes embodied in a new response to war, a privatization of self-preservation with the possibility of becoming your own war profiteer as you wager on future catastrophes. When we each become a micro Halliburton, we can band together to resist to the impulse to investigate impropriety or ethical lapses because the fraud may be our very own

#### Vote AFF to epistemologically interrogate the security logic the United States federal government used to justify its economic sanctions on Cuba – the ballot is a referendum on the desirability of security logic – debate is an academic forum and your job is to inculcate valuable understanding – having a coherent intellectual position is more important than specific political battles

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The central political task of the intellectuals is to aid in the construction of a counterhegemony and thus undermine the prevailing patterns of discourse and interaction that make up the currently dominant hegemony. This task is accomplished through educational activity, because, as Gramsci argues, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350). Discussing the relationship of the “philosophy of praxis” to political practice, Gramsci claims: It [the theory] does not tend to leave the “simple” in their primitive philosophy of common sense, but rather to lead them to a higher conception of life. If it affirms the need for contact between intellectuals and “simple” it is not in order to restrict scientific activity and preserve unity at the low level of the masses, but precisely in order to construct an intellectual-moral bloc which can make politically possible the intellectual progress of the mass and not only of small intellectual groups. (Gramsci 1971: 332-333). According to Gramsci, this attempt to construct an alternative “intellectual-moral bloc” should take place under the auspices of the Communist Party – a body he described as the “modern prince.” Just as Niccolo Machiavelli hoped to see a prince unite Italy, rid the country of foreign barbarians, and create a virtu-ous state, Gramsci believed that the modern price could lead the working class on its journey toward its revolutionary destiny of an emancipated society (Gramsci 1971: 125-205). Gramsci’s relative optimism about the possibility of progressive theorists playing a constructive role in emancipatory political practice was predicated on his belief in the existence of a universal class (a class whose emancipation would inevitably presage the emancipation of humanity itself) with revolutionary potential. It was a gradual loss of faith in this axiom that led Horkheimer and Adorno to their extremely pessimistic prognosis about the possibilities of progressive social change. But does a loss of faith in the revolutionary vocation of the proletariat necessarily lead to the kind of quietism ultimately embraced by the first generation of the Frankfurt School? The conflict that erupted in the 1960s between them and their more radical students suggests not. Indeed, contemporary critical theorists claim that the deprivileging of the role of the proletariat in the struggle for emancipation is actually a positive move. Class remains a very important axis of domination in society, but it is not the only such axis (Fraser 1995). Nor is it valid to reduce all other forms of domination – for example, in the case of gender – to class relations, as orthodox Marxists tend to do. To recognize these points is not only a first step toward the development of an analysis of forms of exploitation and exclusion within society that is more attuned to social reality; it is also a realization that there are other forms of emancipatory politics than those associated with class conflict.1 This in turn suggests new possibilities and problems for emancipatory theory. Furthermore, the abandonment of faith in revolutionary parties is also a positive development. The history of the European left during the twentieth century provides myriad examples of the ways in which the fetishization of party organizations has led to bureaucratic immobility and the confusion of means with ends (see, for example, Salvadori 1990). The failure of the Bolshevik experiment illustrates how disciplined, vanguard parties are an ideal vehicle for totalitarian domination (Serge 1984). Faith in the “infallible party” has obviously been the source of strength and comfort to many in this period and, as the experience of the southern Wales coalfield demonstrates, has inspired brave and progressive behavior (see, for example, the account of support for the Spanish Republic in Francis 1984). But such parties have so often been the enemies of emancipation that they should be treated with the utmost caution. Parties are necessary, but their fetishization is potentially disastrous. History furnishes examples of progressive developments that have been positively influenced by organic intellectuals operating outside the bounds of a particular party structure (G. Williams 1984). Some of these developments have occurred in the particularly intractable realm of security. These examples may be considered as “resources of hope” for critical security studies (R. Williams 1989). They illustrate that ideas are important or, more correctly, that change is the product of the dialectical interaction of ideas and material reality. One clear security-related example of the role of critical thinking and critical thinkers in aiding and abetting progressive social change is the experience of the peace movement of the 1980s. At that time the ideas of dissident defense intellectuals (the “alternative defense” school) encouraged and drew strength from peace activism. Together they had an effect not only on short-term policy but on the dominant discourses of strategy and security, a far more important result in the long run. The synergy between critical security intellectuals and critical social movements and the potential influence of both working in tandem can be witnessed particularly clearly in the fate of common security. As Thomas Risse-Kappen points out, the term “common security” originated in the contribution of peace researchers to the German security debate of the 1970s (Risse-Kappen 1994: 186ff.); it was subsequently popularized by the Palme Commission report (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues 1982). Initially, mainstream defense intellectuals dismissed the concept as hopelessly idealistic; it certainly had no place in their allegedly hardheaded and realist view of the world. However, notions of common security were taken up by a number of different intellectuals communities, including the liberal arms control community in the United States, Western European peace researchers, security specialists in the center-left political parties of Western Europe, and Soviet “institutchiks” – members of the influential policy institutes in the Soviet Union such as the United States of America and Canada Institute (Landau 1996: 52-54; Risse-Kappen 1994: 196-200; Kaldor 1995; Spencer 1995). These communities were subsequently able to take advantage of public pressure exerted through social movements in order to gain broader acceptance for common security. In Germany, for example, “in response to social movement pressure, German social organizations such as churches and trade unions quickly supported the ideas promoted by peace researchers and the SPD” (Risse-Kappen 1994: 207). Similar pressures even had an effect on the Reagan administration. As Risse-Kappen notes: When the Reagan administration brought hard-liners into power, the US arms control community was removed from policy influence. It was the American peace movement and what became known as the “freeze campaign” that revived the arms control process together with pressure from the European allies. (Risse-Kappen 1994: 205; also Cortright 1993: 90-110). Although it would be difficult to sustain a claim that the combination of critical movements and intellectuals persuaded the Reagan government to adopt the rhetoric and substance of common security in its entirety, it is clear that it did at least have a substantial impact on ameliorating U.S. behavior. The most dramatic and certainly the most unexpected impact of alternative defense ideas was felt in the Soviet Union. Through various East-West links, which included arms control institutions, Pugwash conferences, interparty contacts, and even direct personal links, a coterie of Soviet policy analysts and advisers were drawn toward common security and such attendant notions as “nonoffensive defense” (these links are detailed in Evangelista 1995; Kaldor 1995; Checkel 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Landau 1996 and Spencer 1995 concentrate on the role of the Pugwash conferences). This group, including Palme Commission member Georgii Arbatov, Pugwash attendee Andrei Kokoshin , and Sergei Karaganov, a senior adviser who was in regular contact with the Western peace researchers Anders Boserup and Lutz Unterseher (Risse-Kappen 1994: 203), then influenced Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev’s subsequent championing of common security may be attributed to several factors. It is clear, for example, that new Soviet leadership had a strong interest in alleviating tensions in East-West relations in order to facilitate much-needed domestic reforms (“the interaction of ideas and material reality”). But what is significant is that the Soviets’ commitment to common security led to significant changes in force sizes and postures. These in turn aided in the winding down of the Cold War, the end of Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, and even the collapse of Russian control over much of the territory of the former Soviet Union. At the present time, in marked contrast to the situation in the early 1980s, common security is part of the common sense of security discourse. As MccGwire points out, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (a common defense pact) is using the rhetoric of common security in order to justify its expansion into Eastern Europe (MccGwire 1997). This points to an interesting and potentially important aspect of the impact of ideas on politics. As concepts such as common security, and collective security before it (Claude 1984: 223-260), are adopted by governments and military services, they inevitably become somewhat debased. The hope is that enough of the residual meaning can survive to shift the parameters of the debate in a potentially progressive direction. Moreover, the adoption of the concept of common security by official circles provides critics with a useful tool for (immanently) critiquing aspects of security policy (as MccGwire 1997 demonsrates in relation to NATO expansion). The example of common security is highly instructive. First, it indicates that critical intellectuals can be politically engaged and play a role – a significant one at that – in making the world a better and safer place. Second, it points to potential future addressees for critical international theory in general, and critical security studies in particular. Third, it also underlines the role of ideas in the evolution in society. CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND THE THEORY-PRACTICE NEXUS Although most proponents of critical security studies reject aspects of Gramsci’s theory of organic intellectuals, in particular his exclusive concentration on class and his emphasis on the guiding role of the party, the desire for engagement and relevance must remain at the heart of their project. The example of the peace movement suggests that critical theorists can still play the role of organic intellectuals and that this organic relationship need not confine itself to a single class; it can involve alignment with different coalitions of social movements that campaign on an issue or a series of issues pertinent to the struggle for emancipation (Shaw 1994b; R. Walker 1994). Edward Said captures this broader orientation when he suggests that critical intellectuals “are always tied to and ought to remain an organic part of an ongoing experience in society: of the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” (Said 1994: 84). In the specific case of critical security studies, this means placing the experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security at the center of the agenda and making suffering humanity rather than raison d’etat the prism through which problems are viewed. Here the project stands full-square within the critical theory tradition. If “all theory is for someone and for some purpose,” then critical security studies is for “the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless,” and its purpose is their emancipation. The theoretical implications of this orientation have already been discussed in the previous chapters. They involve a fundamental reconceptualization of security with a shift in referent object and a broadening of the range of issues considered as a legitimate part of the discourse. They also involve a reconceptualization of strategy within this expanded notion of security. But the question remains at the conceptual level of how these alternative types of theorizing – even if they are self-consciously aligned to the practices of critical or new social movements, such as peace activism, the struggle for human rights, and the survival of minority cultures – can become “a force for the direction of action.” Again, Gramsci’s work is insightful. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci advances a sophisticated analysis of how dominant discourses play a vital role in upholding particular political and economic orders, or, in Gramsci’s terminology, “historic blocs” (Gramsci 1971: 323-377). Gramsci adopted Machiavelli’s view of power as a centaur, ahlf man, half beast: a mixture of consent and coercion. Consent is produced and reproduced by a ruling hegemony that holds sway through civil society and takes on the status of common sense; it becomes subconsciously accepted and even regarded as beyond question. Obviously, for Gramsci, there is nothing immutable about the values that permeate society; they can and do change. In the social realm, ideas and institutions that were once seen as natural and beyond question (i.e., commonsensical) in the West, such as feudalism and slavery, are now seen as anachronistic, unjust, and unacceptable. In Marx’s well-worn phrase, “All that is solid melts into the air.” Gramsci’s intention is to harness this potential for change and ensure that it moves in the direction of emancipation. To do this he suggests a strategy of a “war of position” (Gramsci 1971: 229-239). Gramsci argues that in states with developed civil societies, such as those in Western liberal democracies, any successful attempt at progressive social change requires a slow, incremental, even molecular, struggle to break down the prevailing hegemony and construct an alternative counterhegemony to take its place. Organic intellectuals have a crucial role to play in this process by helping to undermine the “natural,” “commonsense,” internalized nature of the status quo. This in turn helps create political space within which alternative conceptions of politics can be developed and new historic blocs created. I contend that Gramsci’s strategy of a war of position suggests an appropriate model for proponents of critical security studies to adopt in relating their theorizing to political practice. THE TASKS OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES If the project of critical security studies is conceived in terms of war of position, then the main task of those intellectuals who align themselves with the enterprise is to attempt to undermine the prevailing hegemonic security discourse. This may be accomplished by utilizing specialist information and expertise to engage in an immanent critique of the prevailing security regimes, that is, comparing the justifications of those regimes with actual outcomes. When this is attempted in the security field, the prevailing structures and regimes are found to fail grievously on their own terms. Such an approach also involves challenging the pronouncements of those intellectuals, traditional or organic, whose views serve to legitimate, and hence reproduce, the prevailing world order. This challenge entails teasing out the often subconscious and certainly unexamined assumptions that underlie their arguments while drawing attention to the normative viewpoints that are smuggled into mainstream thinking about security behind its positivist façade. In this sense, proponents of critical security studies approximate to Foucault’s notion of “specific intellectuals” who use their expert knowledge to challenge the prevailing “regime of truth” (Foucault 1980: 132). However, critical theorists might wish to reformulate this sentiment along more familiar Quaker lines of “speaking truth to power” (this sentiment is also central to Said 1994) or even along the eisteddfod lines of speaking “truth against the world.” Of course, traditional strategists can, and indeed do, sometimes claim a similar role. Colin S. Gray, for example, states that “strategists must be prepared to ‘speak truth to power’” (Gray 1982a: 193). But the difference between Gray and proponents of critical security studies is that, whereas the former seeks to influence policymakers in particular directions without questioning the basis of their power, the latter aim at a thoroughgoing critique of all that traditional security studies has taken for granted. Furthermore, critical theorists base their critique on the presupposition, elegantly stated by Adorno, that “the need to lend suffering a voice is the precondition of all truth” (cited in Jameson 1990: 66). The aim of critical security studies in attempting to undermine the prevailing orthodoxy is ultimately educational. As Gramsci notes, “every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily a pedagogic relationship” (Gramsci 1971: 350; see also the discussion of critical pedagogy in Neufeld 1995: 116-121). Thus, by criticizing the hegemonic discourse and advancing alternative conceptions of security based on different understandings of human potentialities, the approach is simultaneously playing apart in eroding the legitimacy of the ruling historic bloc and contributing to the development of a counterhegemonic position. There are a number of avenues of avenues open to critical security specialists in pursuing this educational strategy. As teachers, they can try to foster and encourage skepticism toward accepted wisdom and open minds to other possibilities. They can also take advantage of the seemingly unquenchable thirst of the media for instant pundistry to forward alternative views onto a broader stage. Nancy Fraser argues: “As teachers, we try to foster an emergent pedagogical counterculture …. As critical public intellectuals we try to inject our perspectives into whatever cultural or political public spheres we have access to” (Fraser 1989: 11). Perhaps significantly, support for this type of emancipatory strategy can even be found in the work of the ultrapessimistic Adorno, who argues: In the history of civilization there have been not a few instances when delusions were healed not by focused propaganda, but, in the final analysis, because scholars, with their unobtrusive yet insistent work habits, studied what lay at the root of the delusion. (cited in Kellner 1992: vii) Such “unobtrusive yet insistent work” does not in itself create the social change to which Adorno alludes. The conceptual and the practical dangers of collapsing practice into theory must be guarded against. Rather, through their educational activities, proponent of critical security studies should aim to provide support for those social movements that promote emancipatory social change. By providing a critique of the prevailing order and legitimating alternative views, critical theorists can perform a valuable role in supporting the struggles of social movements. That said, the role of theorists is not to direct and instruct those movements with which they are aligned; instead, the relationship is reciprocal. The experience of the European, North American, and Antipodean peace movements of the 1980s shows how influential social movements can become when their efforts are harnessed to the intellectual and educational activity of critical thinkers. For example, in his account of New Zealand’s antinuclear stance in the 1980s, Michael C. Pugh cites the importance of the visits of critical intellectuals such as Helen Caldicott and Richard Falk in changing the country’s political climate and encouraging the growth of the antinuclear movement (Pugh 1989: 108; see also COrtright 1993: 5-13). In the 1980s peace movements and critical intellectuals interested in issues of security and strategy drew strength and succor from each other’s efforts. If such critical social movements do not exist, then this creates obvious difficulties for the critical theorist. But even under these circumstances, the theorist need not abandon all hope of an eventual orientation toward practice. Once again, the peace movement of the 1980s provides evidence of the possibilities. At that time, the movement benefited from the intellectual work undertaken in the lean years of the peace movement in the late 1970s. Some of the theories and concepts developed then, such as common security and nonoffensive defense, were eventually taken up even in the Kremlin and played a significant role in defusing the second Cold War. Those ideas developed in the 1970s can be seen in Adornian terms of the a “message in a bottle,” but in this case, contra Adorno’s expectations, they were picked up and used to support a program of emancipatory political practice. Obviously, one would be naïve to understate the difficulties facing those attempting to develop alternative critical approaches within academia. Some of these problems have been alluded to already and involve the structural constraints of academic life itself. Said argues that many problems are caused by what he describes as the growing “professionalisation” of academic life (Said 1994: 49-62). Academics are now so constrained by the requirements of job security and marketability that they are extremely risk-averse. It pays – in all senses – to stick with the crowd and avoid the exposed limb by following the prevalent disciplinary preoccupations, publish in certain prescribed journals, and so on. The result is the navel gazing so prevalent in the study of international relations and the seeming inability of security specialists to deal with the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War (Kristensen 1997 highlights the search of U.S. nuclear planners for “new targets for old weapons”). And, of course, the pressures for conformism are heightened in the field of security studies when governments have a very real interest in marginalizing dissent. Nevertheless, opportunities for critical thinking do exist, and this thinking can connect with the practices of social movements and become a “force for the direction of action.” The experience of the 1980s, when, in the depths of the second Cold War, critical thinkers risked demonization and in some countries far worse in order to challenge received wisdom, thus arguably playing a crucial role in the very survival of the human race, should act as both an inspiration and a challenge to critical security studies.

#### Representations are the organizing principles behind which culture defines and manipulates power relations to determine policy – academic interrogation is infinitely more valuable than political simulations

**Hinds & Windt Jr 91** – (1991, Lynn Boyd, is Associate Professor of Broadcasting at West Virginia University. and Theodore Otto, Professor of Political Rhetoric at the University of Pittsburgh. “The Cold War As Rhetoric: The Beginnings, 1945–1950,” 1991, 6-10) // CB  
  
The primary materials for this examination are the central rhetorical texts that formulated the American cold war consensus in the United States. Our concern is with what Professor Richard Cottam of the University of Pittsburgh has called the "generic moment," a time whenperception and rhetoric come together to produce policy, and in the case of the cold war, to produce a universal doctrine. Our theme is taken from Walter Lippmann. In Public Opinion,he wrote: For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture.14If one were to add "political leaders" to "culture," one would have the orientation to what follows in this book. Definitions require language both to conceive of reality and to express it, and the kind of language people use then shapes the ways in which they see the world. Choosing one set of words to define reality rather than another not only orients people, it also creates a grammar that structures reality and then expands into a rhetoric that justifies that reality. Our thesis is that **political rhetoric creates political reality**, and in the case of the American cold war, the universal rhetoric created in the aftermath of World War II created a universal reality. Words and arguments chosen to justify policies took on lives of their own which eventually meant -- especially in the late 1940s and in the 1950s -- that perceptions, opinions, attitudes, policies, and even the way people lived, had to be adjusted more or less (and usually more) to be consistent with this universal rhetoric. No more eloquent example of rhetoric taking on its own life can be found than in the history of George F. Kennan's famous article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Originally written as a private memorandum for James V. Forrestal and based on his private "long telegram," Kennan's article, when published in Foreign Affairs, became the living doctrine of containment. Kennan recorded in his Memoirs that he watched with great anguish as his term containment "was picked up and elevated, by common agreement of the press, to the status of a 'doctrine', which was then identified with the foreign policy of the administration."15 He went on to note that he felt "like one who has inadvertently loosened a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnesses its path of destruction in the valley below, shuddering and wincing at each successive glimpse of disaster." 16 Such was the vitality of Kennan's language and rhetoric. And so too were the vitality and life of Churchill's "Iron Curtain," Truman's Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and a variety of other rhetorical acts that when taken together comprise the American version of the cold war reality. METHODS OF ANALYSIS Political rhetoric creates the arena of political reality from which political thought and action proceed. Such a statement has become commonplace.17Political language and arguments -- in sum, political rhetoric -- **create political consciousness**, **define political settings**, **create national identity**, **stimulate people to act**, and give sense and purpose to these actions.18Political reality is a persuasive description of "things as they are," and once situations are so described, certain responses are eliminated and others seem right. Decisions are discussed and debated within the rhetorical description, ever with an eye toward action. Every society has a need to make sense of things, of its identity as a people or a nation and of the world it inhabits. Government leaders need to provide rationales for their decisions in order to govern. Leaders must convince the public "that the government's decisions are legitimate and good and that its foreign policy is correct."19Politics is about power, and political power functions within the context of a perceived political reality. Citizens, likewise, need to make sense of things. Without a sense of political reality, the "way things are," the individual is **helpless** to understand the myriad of facts and opinions that one is bombarded with daily, especially the things that are far-off and cannot be experienced directly. This need to make sense of the political world evokes a constant outpouring of rhetoric, not only by political leaders but by opinion leaders from all strata of society. In speeches, newspaper editorials, magazine articles, and the like people make rhetorical efforts to argue and describe the "way things are," in short, to understand political reality. Such efforts become intensive and extensive when an old order of political reality changes, as when World War II ended, and a new order is needed to make sense out of the confusion that accompanies the fall of the old. For political rhetoric to function in this fashion, three essential conditions must exist: (1) a "raw" event and/or events or its corollary, confusion about events; (2) a rhetoric that clarifies and assigns meanings to these events; (3) publicity for the rhetoric as others share it at the time. All three of these came together to produce the cold war. But a study of political rhetoric as political reality is more than that. If we "define and then see," such a concept applies both to decisionmakers as well as the general public. The language people use **becomes a part of what they see** because people cannot have definitions without language. In many respects, we are prepared to see what our language has prepared us to see. We account for the rhetoric used in relation to any event in great part through the preconceptions on which it is based. To a substantial degree the rhetoric that accompanies any event comes from an **a priori rhetoric**, based on values that have come to be regarded as basic beliefs, on a preexisting language that is always present exerting its influence in shaping our consciousness, on previous interpretations of past events that may or may not be similar to current events. In such ways are we both liberated and imprisoned by language. Government officials and others do not construct a language or a rhetoric out of thin air; they inherit it from the past and modify or adapt it to meet current or future concerns. Robert Funk observed, "Language does not merely stand at our beck and call; it is there before we are, it situates us, it restricts our horizon, it refuses us its total complicity."20Even as the language politicians use can be dynamic and changing, it also is dependent on rhetorical traditions created previously. The rhetoric of the cold war grew in large part out of **preexisting rhetorics** as diverse as Churchill's long-standing antibolshevism and the war language of World War II, to name only a few. This analysis demonstrates that the events that contributed to the cold war after 1945 had a rhetorical climate that preceded them as well as a rhetorical interpretation that accompanied them. The latter grew out of the former, took a particular direction, and molded the meaning of events to the extent that they created an all-pervasive political reality that not only "explained" events but became landmark events in and of themselves, ordering and interpreting future events as they occurred. Two important points need to be made. First, in the world of practical politics a political rhetoric is often constructed quickly and on an ad hoc basis. George Elsey, a member of President Truman's staff, stated the case for politicians succinctly: "You don't sit down and take time to think through and debate ad nauseam all the points [about an issue]. . . . You don't have time. Later somebody can sit around for days and weeks and figure out how things might have been done differently. This is all very well and very interesting but quite irrelevant."21One must add that it is only irrelevant for those who believe that whatever action is taken and whatever rhetoric constructed to justify that action constituted the most prudent action and rhetoric. For the critic reexamination is always required because language has consequences, often creating the first conception of a political reality of an event and then creating a lasting meaning of that event. Second, the creation of a rhetorical reality is a process, rarely a single event. In the rhetoric of the cold war the reality grew over a period of years before it took hold and became elevated to the level of sacred doctrine, an ideological doctrine whose fundamental principles few dared to challenge and to which almost all had to pay rhetorical respects even when they disagreed about how those principles applied to particular situations. The failures of the architects of the American cold war -- Truman, Acheson, and Kennan -- to restrict the political reality they had created provide compelling illustrations of the power of their own rhetoric. Before getting to the ways in which this rhetorical process worked to define the nature and scope of the cold war, we need to identify the elements that were crucial to its development. Names, Metaphors, and Definitions Thus far we have argued that language is an essential part of reality, not merely a tool to interpret events. Language itself is a creative act, not an added-on interpretation that comes from an act. It is the confluence of act and language that is the first step in **creating reality**, a "raw" event and the political meaning persuasively expressed that is attached to that event. Language and events cannot be easily separated once they become public currency. Again, we turn to Funk who noted: Language and understanding arise together, are reciprocal. The common [event or actuality] to which they refer both precedes and follows. It makes them possible, and yet the common reality does not become audible without language and understanding. Language and understanding both arise out of and invoke shared reality.**22**This process of uniting the two, we call a language-event, a unity of political language and actual events that creates political reality both in perception and in expression. For this analysis of the cold war reality, there are three important ways in which language created that reality: through naming, through metaphor, and through formal definitions. Kenneth Burke remarked that all language is "magical" or creative because "the mere act of naming an object or situation decrees that it is to be singled out as such-and-such rather than as something-other."23In this understanding of language we are not merely saying something when we use language, we are doing something. When we name an object, it **becomes real for us** because naming "does not mean inventing a convenient designation, but giving reality to the object, calling it into [meaningful] existence."24This conception of language has its roots in antiquity, and although it was once discarded by the modern scientific world as a mythical understanding of reality, its significance has been rediscovered by Burke and the postmodernists. The scientific conception of language came to be associated with its noetic function, that is, a word was thought of as a symbol that only conveys meaning, a tool separate from the thing it described. Louis Halle used this concept of language in describing the changes that American leaders had to make in foreign policy in the postwar period. He argued that the confusions of that period and Soviet expansionism required a new language to express the new "realities" of tensions in the world: What was required in the first instance, for the replacement of the projected foreign policy by a policy applicable to the developing circumstances, was a conscious recognition of the realities to which it would have to be applicable. The American Government and the American people . . . would then have to accept the need to re-establish a balance of power by filling the remaining power vacuums and thereby limiting the further expansion of the Russian empire. Such a conceptual change as this, while it might take place more rapidly in the subconscious mind, could hardly be explicitly formulated and adopted as such until after an interval of intellectual confusion and inner conflict, during which some persons would continue to adhere with a sort of blind desperation to the outdated concepts and their attendant language, while others would recognize the increasingly manifest realities without being able to find a coherent intellectual pattern or forms of words into which to fit them.25Clearly, Halle viewed language as a tool of expression, not as a creative rhetorical process. For Halle, the new cold war "reality" existed waiting only to be "recognized." Once recognized, the task for U.S. leaders became an independent search for appropriate concepts and language to express that reality. In the older mythic realm, however, language and the comprehension of reality were more deeply fused. This latter conception of language guides our understanding about rhetoric's role in the political construction of reality.

#### To propose a decisive plan of action is to bind critical theory to political exigency – that just reifies securitization and makes progressive politics fail

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On the one hand, critical theory cannot let itself be bound by political exigency; indeed, it has something of an obligation to refuse such exigency. While there are always decisive choices to be made in the political realm (whom to vote for, what policies to support or oppose, what action to take or defer), these very delimitations of choice are often themselves the material of critical theory. Here we might remind ourselves that prying apart immediate political constraints from intellectual ones is one path to being "governed a little less" in Foucault's sense. Yet allowing thinking its wildness beyond the immediate in order to reset the possibilities of the immediate is also how this degoverning rearticulates critical theory and politics after disarticulating them; critical theory comes back to politics offering a different sense of the times and a different sense of time. It is also important to remember that the "immediate choices" are just that and often last no longer than a political season (exemplified by the fact that the political conundrums with which this essay opened will be dated if not forgotten by the time this book is published). Nor is the argument convincing that critical theory threatens the possibility of holding back the political dark. It is difficult to name a single instance in which critical theory has killed off a progressive political project. Critical theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their imaginative reach and vigor.

#### Predictability is a nihilistic illusion built upon a myth of sameness and unity grounded in a fear of the flux and movement which lie at the heart of life – embrace the ecstasy of risk and the glory of active interpretation which uses force to wrest meaning from the abyss of nihilism

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Freud is not blind to this: "The producer which the author makes his Zoe adopt for curing her childhood friend's delusion shows a far reaching similarity - no, a complete agreement in its essence - with the analytical method which consists, as applied to patients suffering from disorders analogous to Hanold's delusion, in bringing to their consciousness, to some extent forcibly, the unconscious whose repression led to their falling ill" (Standard Edition, IX, 88). Such is the powerful thrust of similitude. Freud has no more qualms to reduce "poetic creations" to real persons or the "Pompeian fancy" to a simple "psychiatric study." Beneath the trappings of truth, on the razor's edge of demonstration, forces are confronting each other in order to turn the process - the text -into a product. If Gradiva adheres so perfectly to the analytical mold, the analysis of the novel must serve as an absolute proof, in Freud's words, of the theory of the unconscious. Absolute proof - or absolute counter-proof... Even thought "absolute" is clearly too strong a word for such a circum-scribed operation, to counter Freud's interpretation and thus unsettle he theory of the unconscious is indeed the substance of the present attempt. Not to replace Freud's elaborate construct with another, more powerful, mode of evaluation would certainly prove the wisdom in the face of the illusion of truth. Although "nihilistic" at heart, such a perspective is not bound to be simply negative. It can attest to a growing force. I realize that I can overcome the temptation of total interpretations, whose values are universal (they are actually symptoms of fear and apathy). To destroy the belief in the law, to dissipate the fiction of predictability, to reject the sage recurrence of the "same," this is not just a "critical" stand. It is an act of force. But destruction must not open onto an absence of values, worthless or meaninglessness. It must lead to a new evaluation. Nietzsche sees in the wisdom of the East a principle of decadence, a weakening of the power of appropriation. Force of intention matters more than will to truth. To reject truth without intensifying the force of invention still participates in the ascetic ideal, thus in ressentiment. "To read off a text without interposing an interpretation" therefore is "hardly possible" (The Will to Power, 479). I must use my creative forces to create values without falling into the inertia of truth or an anemia of will. I must render the text, and the world, to their "disturbing and enigmatic character"; will them incomprehensible, elusive, "in flux," only indebted to perspective valuations: "The greater the impulse toward unity, the more firmly may one conclude that weakness is present; the greater the impulse toward variety, differentiation, inner decay, the more force is present" (WP, 655). Inner decay: to dance away over oneself. Motion, not emotions. Freud's interpretation resists the false neutrality of science. It only shows a sign of decline when it aims for the truth, when it succumbs to the temptation of unity, the sick security of monism, the illusion of a reconciliation. A reactive interpretation, it assumes powerful, but fabricated, weapons: the difference between objects and subjects, cause and effect, means and ends, etc. That Gradiva presents a certain order of succession in no way proves that individual moments are related to one another as cause and effect, that they obey a "law" and a calculus but rather that different factions abruptly confront each other in their attempt to draw their ultimate consequence at every moment. "As long as there is a structure, as long as there is a method, or better yet as long as structure and method exist through the mental, through intelligence, time is trapped - or else we imagine we have trapped it" (John Cage, Pour les Oiseaux. Belfond, 1976, 34). Structural analysis properly discerned that a narrative establishes | a confusion between time (succession) and logic (cause and effect). However, instead of "delogifying" time, it forced narrative time to sub-mit to narrative logic. Far from being dispelled, the confusion became the very springboard of analysis! It is high time to take advantage of this latency of the narrative, of the divorce between consequence and construction, in order to "rechronocize" succession. I will, here and now, stop wanting the story to go somewhere. I will forget what I know feebly, in advance, in order to gather the whole complexity of forces at play in a text. I will learn to resist the melody of casual relations and the torpor of narrative accumulations in order to reinvent the intensity of risks, ceaselessly menacing and forever being reborn.

#### A focus on the structures of security are required to transform our approach to politics

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While recommendations to **shift our frame of orientation** away from conventional **state-centrism** toward a **'human security' approach** are valid, this cannot be achieved without confronting the **deeper theoretical assumptions** underlying **conventional approaches to 'non-traditional' security issues**.106 By occluding the **structural origin** and **systemic dynamic** of global **ecological, energy and economic crises**, orthodox approaches are **incapable of transforming them**. Coupled with their excessive state-centrism, this means they operate largely at the level of **'surface' impacts** of global crises in terms of how they will affect quite traditional security issues relative to sustaining state integrity, such as international **terrorism, violent conflict and population movements**. Global crises end up fuelling the **projection of risk onto social networks**, **groups and countries** that cross the geopolitical fault-lines of these 'surface' impacts - **which happen to intersect largely with Muslim communities**. Hence, regions particularly vulnerable to **climate change** impacts, containing large repositories of hydrocarbon **energy resources**, or subject to demographic transformations in the context of rising population pressures, have become the **focus of state security** planning in the context of counter-terrorism operations abroad.

The intensifying problematisation and **externalisation of Muslim-**majority regions and populations by **Western security agencies - as a discourse** - is therefore not only interwoven with growing state perceptions of global crisis acceleration, but driven ultimately by an **epistemological failure** to **interrogate the systemic causes of this acceleration** in collective state policies (which themselves occur in the context of particular social, political and economic structures). This expansion of militarisation is thus coeval with the subliminal normative presumption that the social relations of the perpetrators, in this case Western states, must be protected and perpetuated at any cost - precisely because the efficacy of the prevailing geopolitical and economic order is ideologically beyond question.

As much as this analysis highlights a direct link between global systemic crises, social polarisation and state militarisation, it **fundamentally undermines the idea** of a symbiotic **link between natural resources and conflict** per se. **Neither 'resource shortages' nor 'resource abundance'** (in ecological, energy, food and monetary terms) **necessitate conflict** by themselves.

There are two key operative factors that determine whether either condition could lead to conflict. The first is the extent to which either condition can generate socio-political crises that challenge or undermine the prevailing order. The second is the way in which stakeholder actors choose to actually respond to the latter crises. To understand these factors accurately requires close attention to the political, economic and ideological **strictures of resource exploitation, consumption and distribution** between different social groups and classes. **Overlooking the systematic causes** of social crisis leads to a heightened tendency to **problematise its symptoms**, in the forms of challenges from particular social groups. This can lead to **externalisation of those groups**, **and** the **legitimisation of violence towards them**.

Ultimately, this systems approach to global crises strongly suggests that conventional **policy 'reform' is woefully inadequate**. Global warming and energy depletion are manifestations of a civilisation which is in overshoot. The current scale and organisation of human activities is breaching the limits of the wider environmental and natural resource systems in which industrial civilisation is embedded. This breach is now increasingly visible in the form of two interlinked crises in global food production and the global financial system. In short, industrial civilisation in its current form is unsustainable. This calls for a process of wholesale civilisational transition to adapt to the inevitable arrival of the post-carbon era through social, political and economic transformation.

Yet conventional theoretical and policy approaches fail to (1) fully engage with the gravity of research in the natural sciences and (2) **translate the social science implications** of this research in terms of the embeddedness of human social systems in natural systems. Hence, **lacking capacity for epistemological self-reflection** and inhibiting the transformative responses urgently required, **they reify and normalise mass violence against diverse 'Others'**, newly **constructed as traditional security threats** enormously amplified by global crises - a process that guarantees the intensification and globalisation of insecurity on the road to **ecological, energy and economic catastrophe**. Such an outcome, of course, is **not inevitable**, but extensive new transdisciplinary research in IR and the wider social sciences - drawing on and integrating human and critical security studies, political ecology, historical sociology and historical materialism, while engaging directly with developments in the natural sciences - is urgently required to develop coherent conceptual frameworks which could **inform more sober, effective, and joined-up policy-making on these issues.**

## 2ac

### 1nc food security

**Food security pays lip service to the hungry while serving as a justification for the violent expansion of global governance**

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Since the 1970s, the concept of ‘food security’ has been the primary lens through which the ongoing prevalence and inherent complexity of global hunger has been viewed. The adoption of the term at the FAO-sanctioned World Food Conference in 1974 has led to a burgeoning literature on the subject, most of which takes ‘food security’ as an unproblematic starting point from which to address the persistence of so-called ‘food insecurity’ (see Gilmore & Huddleston, 1983; Maxwell, 1990; 1991; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). A common activity pursued by academics specialising in food security is to debate the appropriate definition of the term; a study undertaken by the Institute of Development Studies cites over 200 competing definitions (Smith et al., 1992). This pervasive predilection for empirical clarity is symptomatic of traditional positivist epistemologies and constrains a more far-sighted understanding of the power functions of ‘food security’ itself, a conceptual construct now accorded considerable institutional depth.2 Bradley Klein contends that to understand the political force of organizing principles like food security, a shift of analytical focus is required: ‘Instead of presuming their existence and meaning, we ought to historicize and relativize them as sets of practices with distinct genealogical trajectories’ (1994: 10). The forthcoming analysis traces the emergence and evolution of food security discourse in official publications and interrogates the intertextual relations which pertain between these publications and other key sites of discursive change and/or continuity. Absent from much (if not all) of the academic literature on food security is any reflection on the governmental content of the concept of ‘security’ itself. The notion of food security is received and regurgitated in numerous studies which seek to establish a better, more comprehensive food security paradigm. Simon Maxwell has produced more work of this type than anyone else in the field and his studies are commonly referenced as foundational to food security studies (Shaw, 2005; see Maxwell, 1990; 1991; 1992; 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). Maxwell has traced the evolution in thinking on food security since the 1970s and distinguishes three paradigm shifts in its meaning: from the global/national to the household/individual, from a food first perspective to a livelihood perspective and from objective indicators to subjective perception (Maxell, 1996; Devereux & Maxwell, 2001). There is something of value in the kind of analysis Maxwell employs and these three paradigm shifts provide a partial framework with which to compare the results of my own analysis of food security discourse. I suggest, however, that the conclusions Maxwell arrives at are severely restricted by his unwillingness to reflect on food security as a governmental mechanism of global liberal governance. As a ‘development expert’ he employs an epistemology infused with concepts borrowed from the modern development discourse; as such, his conclusions reflect a concern with the micro-politics of food security and a failure to reflect on the macro-politics of ‘food security’ as a specific rationality of government. In his article ‘Food Security: A Post-Modern Perspective’ (1996) Maxwell provides a meta-narrative which explains the discursive shifts he distinguishes. He argues that the emerging emphasis on ‘flexibility, diversity and the perceptions of the people concerned’ (1996: 160) in food security discourse is consistent with currents of thought in other spheres which he vaguely labels ‘post-modern’. In line with ‘one of the most popular words in the lexicon of post-modernism’, Maxwell claims to have ‘deconstructed’ the term ‘food security’; in so doing, ‘a new construction has been proposed, a distinctively post-modern view of food security’ (1996: 161-162). This, according to Maxwell, should help to sharpen programmatic policy and bring theory and knowledge closer to what he calls ‘real food insecurity’ (1996: 156). My own research in the forthcoming analysis contains within it an explicit critique of Maxwell’s thesis, based on three main observations. First, Maxwell’s ‘reconstruction’ of food security and re-articulation of its normative criteria reproduce precisely the kind of technical, managerial set of solutions which characterise the positivistic need for definitional certainty that he initially seeks to avoid. Maxwell himself acknowledges ‘the risk of falling into the trap of the meta-narrative’ and that ‘the ice is admittedly very thin’ (1996: 162-163), but finally prefers to ignore these misgivings when faced with the frightening (and more accurately ‘post-modern’) alternative. Second, I suggest that the third shift which Maxwell distinguishes, from objective indicators to subjective perceptions, is a fabrication which stems more from his own normative beliefs than evidence from official literature. To support this part of his argument Maxwell quotes earlier publications of his own work in which his definition incorporates the ‘subjective dimension’ of food security (cf. Maxwell, 1988). As my own analysis reveals, while lip-service is occasionally paid to the lives and faces of hungry people, food security analysis is constituted by increasingly extensive, technological and professedly ‘objective’ methods of identifying and stratifying the ‘food insecure’. This comprises another distinctly positivistic endeavour. Finally, Maxwell’s emphasis on ‘shifts’ in thinking suggests the replacement of old with new – the global/national concern with food supply and production, for example, is replaced by a new and more enlightened concern for the household/individual level of food demand and entitlements. Discursive change, however, defies such linear boundary drawing; the trace of the old is always already present in the form of the new. I suggest that Maxwell’s ‘shifts’ should rather be conceived as ‘additions’; the implication for food security is an increasingly complex agenda, increasingly amorphous definitions and the establishment of new divisions of labour between ‘experts’ in diverse fields. This results in a technocratic discourse which ‘presents policy as if it were directly dictated by matters of fact (thematic patterns) and deflects consideration of values choices and the social, moral and political responsibility for such choices’ (Lemke, 1995: 58, emphasis in original). The dynamics of technocratic discourse are examined further in the forthcoming analysis. These observations inform the explicit critique of contemporary understandings of food security which runs conterminously with the findings of my analysis. I adopt a broad perspective from which to interrogate food security as a discursive technology of global liberal governance. Food security is not conceived as an isolated paradigm, but as a component of overlapping discourses of human security and sustainable development which emerged concurrently in the 1970s. The securitisation process can be regarded in some cases as an extreme form of politicisation, while in others it can lead to a depoliticisation of the issue at hand and a replacement of the political with technological or scientific remedies. I show how the militaristic component of traditional security discourse is reproduced in the wider agenda of food security, through the notions of risk, threat and permanent emergency that constitute its governmental rationale.

### 2ac – visibility

#### There’s literally zero link to this argument- their link criticizes depicting suffering

### 2nc – alt overview

**The aff adopt a pedagogical stance towards resisting the hegemonic paradigm of securitization –** only within educational spaces such as policy debate can we create a spill-up effect to change policy – history proves academia shapes policy – dissident intellectuals during the “freeze campaign” revived arms control and Soviety policy analysts brought the Civil war to an end – this outweighs any possible conservative backlash created by the alt because otherwise decisionmakers recycle threats to rouse public support which makes their harms a self-fulfilling prophecy and causes serial policy failure, that’s **1nc Jones** – star that evidence

#### Representations are policy. Two warrants–

#### Identity- rhetoric shapes how we view and react towards other people- empirically proven by Iraq- we labeled them a rogue state which structured the invasion and policy goals of the defense base. That’s Hindts and Wendt

#### Structures pedagogy- historically, our representations of Latin America has determined research practices and foreign policy writ large- by problematizing normalized structures of foreign relations, it spills up to broader policies- that’s Bertucci

#### Their politics are a depolitical form of fragmentation that collapses into irrelevance – defer to specificity.

**Kurki, 11**

(Milja, Aberystwyth University, UK The Limitations of the Critical Edge: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Published Online) <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/05/07/0305829811411997.full.pdf> [9/12/11])

It is a sign of the times that while dissatisfaction with the political and economic struc­tures of society is rife, **academic criticism of the politico-economic system we live in**, and which is simultaneously promulgated by our foreign policy machines around the world, **is surprisingly impotent and ineffective**. The excesses of the liberal capitalist developmental blueprint received a minor ‘rap on the wrists’ by the crisis of 2009, but nevertheless the structure and the external policies of market democracies around the world remain much the same. If the end of the Cold War is supposed to have ‘ended his­tory’, disappointingly it is **the 2009 crisis** that **seems to be a more telling sign of the end of history; it shows that no real ‘ideational’ alternative seems to exist to global capitalism as a model of growth or to the ideals of liberal market democratisation as a way of expanding the sphere of freedom**. **The left and other radical politico-economic models are on the wane** as authoritarian capitalism presents, it seems, the most viable challenge to the hegemony of liberal market democracy. **This pessimism** on the question of progressive alternative politics at a time of crisis **stems from** my recent **research**, **the aim of which has been to interrogate whether room exists for alternative politico-economic visions in today’s democracy assistance.** In its initial stages, this research was driven by an optimistic belief in the power of critical theory to generate new and important avenues for rethinking the deeply consequential policy practice of democracy assistance. Yet, worries have appeared about such pros­pects. One is that **it has become evident** (somewhat unsurprisingly) **that room for criti­cal interventions in policy practice is fairly limited**. A far more worrying issue, however, is the observation that **critical theory is increasingly lacking in relevance in contribut­ing to the revitalisation of policy practice or perceptive critiques of it**. **This is because of** **the abstract and theory-driven nature of critical theory and its lack of realistic under­standing as to how to challenge the dominance of hegemonic ideas in today’s foreign policy practice**. As Richard Youngs has argued **in relation to critical theoretical inves­tigations of democracy support, critical theorists today are dangerously behind the curve on policy practices and theoretically obsessed with critiques of little use to prac­titioners**.1 **It really is rather disappointing for – and a disappointing symptom of – alternative, or so-called ‘critical’, thinking in the social sciences that even when the problems of the dominant model are evident, there is no real systematic, effective or realistic opposition to it**. Why is there such a dearth of successful or influential ‘critical’ thinking even in the relatively ‘fruitful’ context of multiple social and economic crises? This is a big question, requiring, for an adequate treatment, a holistic sociological study conducted on multiple levels of analysis of society. Nothing of this nature can be attempted here, but we can, and arguably should, on the 40th anniversary of *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* – one of the leading critical theory journals in International Relations (IR) – reflect on some of the key trends in critical and philosophical research in IR, with the hope that this might reveal something characteristic of wider trends. With this in mind, I reflect on the prospects of critical theoretical analysis in IR and, in so doing, hope to add a new angle (or rather reintroduce an old angle) to assessment of critical theory’s role in IR. Despite many excellent reviews of the development and fortunes of critical and phil­osophical research in IR,2 **few have analysed in detail the curious depoliticising and fragmentation-oriented trends afflicting critical theory and associated forms of philo­sophical analysis today**. Also, **few analysts have dared to openly comment on the striking failures of critical theory to bring about or facilitate progressive change in today’s world political environment.** It is my aim here to open the discussion towards a more (self-)critical analysis of critical theory in IR.

### 2ac – cede the political

#### Non-unique: the political has already been ceded to conservative ideology.

#### We link turn these arguments- starting with academia encourages more engagement with political institutions and spills up to policy- that’s Jones.

#### Alternative conceptions of the ballot reflect the politics of delusion – their performative method is a fantasy that confines radicalism to a forum where it’s guaranteed to accomplish nothing.

**Gunnell, 86** - Distinguished Professor of Political Science at University of Albany (John G., “Tradition, Interpretation, and Science: Political Theory in the American Academy” pages 351-352)

There may be pointed exceptions; but, on the whole, the radicalism of political theory in the American university is now distinctly academic in both senses of that term. This is due in part to some definite historical factors internal to the evolution of the social sciences in the United States. There is a great distance between the radical activist origins of social science in America (during the twenty years from 1865 to 1885) and contemporary claims about radical social science and critical political theory. What has intervened is academic professionalism. Radical or critical political theory is an idea, largely something that is talked about rather than practiced. It is an academic fantasy and a faint memory which long ago severed any real connection with the objects in their concern. Only a strange academic pretension produces the notion that finding the right philosophical grounding can make academic political theory into something more than it is. Only another pretension implies that depth of concern or other emotive attributes can make this academic practice, as either scholarly production or classroom education, a form of political action or some equivalent to it.

Secured (or imprisoned) within structures of the university and profession, self-ascribed academic radicals posture like actors on a stage. They only descend into the audience within the limits of certain avante-garde productions that would never, in the end, endanger their status as actors or propel the audience beyond the role of spectators. But even the audience consists primarily of other actors. Caught up in this academic theater, they come to believe after a while that the play is the most real thing, that acting is a more noble and efficacious endeavor than the actual practices of life, and that its purity must be maintained. In large measure, of course, this is rhetoric, but not the rhetoric of the street. Political myth is one thing, but mythical politics is another.

While these actors have visions of the world which they wish to reproduce, they have long since lost touch with the concrete character of society, and their world is the product of a script written by others. Maybe the greatest irony is that, while their performances are dedicated to changing the world, they seldom address the specific world in which they reside. They are content to play in a theater whose management and financing is microcosm of the world which they wish to transform, but their vision is too prodigious to be directed toward such small objects. They may complain in passing about the way the players are hired and fired and about the lack of democracy in the company, but they are on the road too frequently to get involved deeply. And, after all, it is their sinecure as permanent members of the troupe that allows them to display their grand gestures without fear of contamination or reprisal.

There are some, usually the more conservative players, who also think that society is a seamless web and that theater changes the world, and they become upset at stage histrionics which mock and criticize life. But much paranoia is surpassed only by the blind faith of those who believe that their performances transform the lives of those with whom they come into contact and that the theater is surely so much a part of life that any real distinction is forced and analytic. It is difficult to know how many have a real passion for the life which they represent on stage or the extent to which their drama is a surrogate for what the world denies them or what they have denied themselves. Probably, many are just actors with feigned and rehearsed concern which they have acquired from their masters and coaches. For them, the play is the thing. For a few, however, these scenes are a vehicle for higher purpose. Sadly, society reserves the theater for their activity, putting them safely away where anything can be said, because everyone knows that it is just a play. Society knows that, in the end, the demands of the profession will keep most from mixing their art with life. Of the few who escape to seek recognition outside the theater, it is safe to assume that they are too inexperienced in the ways of the world to manipulate it and that the worst oppression is simply to ignore them.

This fable is merely a way of making a long story short. But I do want to make it as clear as possible that the apoliticalness and conservatism ascribed to me is charged against a background of alienated and philosophical radicalism that seldom talks about actual practices, let alone to them. My concern with the open society, which Reid takes to reflect attachment to liberal ideology, simply comes from the observation that such a society effectively defuses radicalism. It does so particularly by reserving the university for radical talk, deprived or at least flattened of potential significance through pure tolerance. Reid wishes to pose the question of "the theorist's public responsibility," and this question should be posed. But my brief comments about the open society are less a way of legitimating the abdication of that responsibility than a way of indicating how it cannot be fulfilled in terms of alienated political theory. To couch diagnosis and prescription in this language is to continue to ensure impotence-both because it has no audience and because it obscures the world as much as the conceptual schemes of orthodox social science. It merely substitutes one reified structure for another.

#### The alt is silence, which is infinitely worse.

**Kleinman and Kleinman 97** (Arthur, Maude and Lillian Presley Professor of Medical Anthropology, and Joan, sinologist, Research Associate, Medical Anthropology Program at Harvard, “The appeal of experience; the dismay of images: Cultural appropriations of suffering in our times,” Social Suffering, pg. 16-18, google books)//a-berg

\*don’t endorse the ableist language: CEASE replaced “paralyze”.

It is necessary to balance the account of the globalization of commercial and professional images with a vastly different and even more dangerous cultural process of appropriation: the totalitarian state's erasure of social experiences of suffering through the suppression of images. Here the possibility of moral appeal through images of human misery is prevented, and it is their absence that is the source of existential dismay. Such is the case with the massive starvation in China from 1959 to 1961. This story was not reported at the time even though more than thirty million Chinese died in the aftermath of the ruinous policies of the Great Leap Forward, the perverse effect of Mao's impossible dream of forcing immediate industrialization on peasants. Accounts of this, the world's most devastating famine, were totally suppressed; no stories or pictures of the starving or the dead were published. An internal report on the famine was made by an investigating team for the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. It was based on a detailed survey of an extremely poor region of Anwei Province that was particularly brutally affected. The report includes this numbing statement by Wei Wu-ji, a local peasant leader from Anwei: Originally there were 5,000 people in our commune, now only 3,200 remain. When the Japanese invaded we did not lose this many: we at least could save ourselves by running away! This year there's no escape. We die shut up in our own houses. Of my 6 family members, 5 are already dead, and I am left to starve, and I'll not be able to stave off death for long.(30) Wei Wu-ji continued: Wang Jia-feng from West Springs County reported that cases of eating human meat were discovered. Zhang Sheng-jiu said, "Only an evil man could do such a thing!" Wang Jia-feng said, "In 1960, there were 20 in our household, ten of them died last year. My son told his mother 'I'll die of hunger in a few days.'" And indeed he did.(31) The report also includes a graphic image by Li Qin-ming, from Wudian County, Shanwang Brigade: In 1959, we were prescheduled to deliver 58,000 jin of grain to the State, but only 35,000 jin were harvested, hence we only turned over 33,000 jin, which left 2,000 jin for the commune. We really have nothing to eat. The peasants eat hemp leaves, anything they can possibly eat. In my last report after I wrote, "We have nothing to eat," the Party told me they wanted to remove my name from the Party Roster. Out of a population of 280, 170 died. In our family of five, four of us have died leaving only myself. Should I say that I'm not broken hearted?(32) Chen Zhang-yu, from Guanyu County, offered the investigators this terrible image: Last spring the phenomenon of cannibalism appeared. Since Comrade Chao Wu-chu could not come up with any good ways of prohibiting it, he put out the order to secretly imprison those who seemed to be at death's door to combat the rumors. He secretly imprisoned 63 people from the entire country. Thirty-three died in prison.(33) The official report is thorough and detailed. It is classified neibu, restricted use only. To distribute it is to reveal state secrets. Presented publicly it would have been, especially if it had been published in the 1960s, a fundamental critique of the Great Leap, and a moral and political delegitimation of the Chinese Communist Party's claim to have improved the life of poor peasants. Even today the authorities regard it as dangerous. The official silence is another form of appropriation. It prevents public witnessing. It forges a secret history, an act of political resistance through keeping alive the memory of things denied.34 The totalitarian state rules by collective forgetting, by denying the collective experience of suffering, and thus creates a culture of terror. The absent image is also a form of political appropriation; public silence is perhaps more terrifying than being overwhelmed by public images of atrocity. Taken together the two modes of appropriation delimit the extremes in this cultural process.(35) Our critique of appropriations of suffering that do harm does not mean that no appropriations are valid. To conclude that would be to undermine any attempt to respond to human misery. It would be much more destructive than the problem we have identified; it would **[CEASE]**~~paralyze~~ social action. We must draw upon the images of human suffering in order to identify human needs and to craft humane responses.

**Deleuze and Guattari’s alternative fails and leads to authoritarian oppression.**

**Barbrook 98** (Richard, coordinator of the Hypermedia Research Centre at the University of Westminster, 8/27, http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-9808/msg00091.html)

Techno-nomad TJs are attracted by the uncompromising theoretical radicalism expressed by Deleuze and Guattari. However, far from succumbing to an outside conspiracy, Frequence Libre imploded because of the particular New Left politics which inspired A Thousand Plateaus and the other sacred texts. Unwilling to connect abstract theory with its practical application, the techno-nomads cannot see how Deleuze and Guattari's celebration of direct democracy was simultaneously a justification for intellectual elitism. This elitism was no accident. Because of their very different life experiences, many young people in the sixties experienced a pronounced 'generation gap' between themselves and their parents. Feeling so isolated, they believed that society could only be changed by a revolutionary vanguard composed of themselves and their comrades. This is why many young radicals simultaneously believed in two contradictory concepts. First, the revolution would create mass participation in running society. Second, the revolution could only be organised by a committed minority.<14> The New Left militants were reliving an old problem in a new form. Back in the 1790s, Robespierre had argued that the democratic republic could only be created by a revolutionary dictatorship. During the 1917 Russian revolution, Lenin had advocated direct democracy while simultaneously instituting the totalitarian rule of the Bolsheviks. As their 'free radio' experience showed, Deleuze and Guattari never escaped from this fundamental contradiction of revolutionary politics. The absence of the Leninist party did not prevent the continuation of vanguard politics. As in other social movements, Fr=E9quence Libre was dominated by a few charismatic individuals: the holy prophets of the anarcho-communist revolution.<15> In Deleuze and Guattari's writings, this deep authoritarianism found its theoretical expression in their methodology: semiotic structuralism. Despite rejecting its 'wooden language', the two philosophers never really abandoned Stalinism in theory. Above all, they retained its most fundamental premise: the minds of the majority of the population were controlled by bourgeois ideologies.<16> During the sixties, this elitist theory was updated through the addition of Lacanian structuralism by Louis Althusser, the chief philosopher of the French Communist party.<17> For Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser had explained why only a revolutionary minority supported the New Left. Brainwashed by the semiotic 'machinic assemblages' of the family, media, language and psychoanalysis, most people supposedly desired fascism rather than anarcho-communism. This authoritarian methodology clearly contradicted the libertarian rhetoric within Deleuze and Guattari's writings. Yet, as the rappers who wanted to make a show for Frequence Libre discovered, Deleuzoguattarian anarcho-communism even included the censorship of music. By adopting an Althusserian analysis, Deleuze and Guattari were tacitly privileging their own role as intellectuals: the producers of semiotic systems. Just like their Stalinist elders, the two philosophers believed that only the vanguard of intellectuals had the right to lead the masses - without any formal consent from them - in the fight against capitalism.

### 2ac – framework overview

#### The 1AC challenges the conservative ideologies that frame Latin America within the foreign policy community today, while their interpretation maintains status quo epistemologies towards the region which have traditionally resulted in serial policy failure- the aff is a first step in the right direction and a prerequisite to effective policymaking.

### 2ac – we meet

#### First, we meet: representations are policy. Two warrants–

#### Identity- rhetoric shapes how we view and react towards other people- empirically proven by Iraq- we labeled them a rogue state which structured the invasion and policy goals of the defense base. That’s Hindts and Wendt

#### Structures pedagogy- historically, our representations of Latin America has determined research practices and foreign policy writ large- by problematizing normalized structures of foreign relations, it spills up to broader policies- that’s Bertucci

### 2ac – c/i

#### Counter-interpretation: the judge is an academic and the role of the ballot is to determine who best interrogates the systems of knowledge behind the resolution. Instead of a topical discussion, we should have a discussion of the topic.

#### “Resolved” means to reduce through mental analysis

Random House Unabridged Dictionary, 6

(http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/resolved)

Resolve: 1.To come to a definite or earnest decision about; determine (to do something): I have resolved that I shall live to the full. 2.to separate into constituent or elementary parts; break up; cause or disintegrate (usually fol. by into). 3.to reduce or convert by, or as by, breaking up or disintegration (usually fol. by to or into). 4.to convert or transform by any process (often used reflexively). 5.to reduce by mental analysis (often fol. by into).

#### The colon proves our interpretation

**Peck, 1996** (Frances, University of Ottawa, Ottawa Grammar Guide, <http://www.uottawa.ca/academic/arts/writcent/hypergrammar/punct.html>)

The colon focuses the reader's attention on what is to follow, and as a result, you should use it to introduce a list, a summation, or an idea that somehow **completes the introductory idea**. You may use the colon in this way, however, only after an independent clause: He visited three cities during his stay in the Maritimes: Halifax, Saint John and Moncton. Their lobbying efforts were ultimately useless: the bill was soundly defeated. My mother gave me one good piece of advice: to avoid wasting time and energy worrying about things I cannot change.

#### Topicality should not be a-priori- this debate is a question of impacts and competing interpretations

#### Additionally, the affirmative should pick a resolutional framework and the neg has to debate within it- it’s the most predictable and guarantees stasis- their interpretation is arbitrary and makes debate impossible.

### 2ac – education

#### Their interpretation replicates failed education– it’s a question of means v. ends. Our burke evidence indicates we can’t just translate education into policies- we have to focus on education first and then policy afterwards.

#### Other rounds solve their education claims– they debate policy 90% of the time, our aff is a key interruption

#### Our Elmer and Opel evidence is also an impact turn to this- their framework is a method of terror politics that shuts off debate from more productive methods

**Education outweighs – we’re a prior question to any of their skills**

**Mignolo 13** (Walter, Professor at Duke University, Joint Appointments in Cultural Anthropology and Romance Studies , “DECOLONIAL THINKING AND EDUCATION: FRAGMENTS OF A ¨TERTULIA”, waltermignolo.com/ 1/25/13)

On December 26, 2012 was held in Buenos Aires a Tertulia, convened by Walter Mignolo (Duke University) and Cecilia Hecht (BioeconTV) in a legendary cafe on Avenida Corrientes, a ¨tertulia¨ on [decolonial thinking, cashless economy and education.](https://vimeo.com/58011376) The conversation focused on education. The topic was introduced by a quotation from the book of Ivan Ilyich ([Deschooling Society](http://www.preservenet.com/theory/Illich/Deschooling/intro.html" \t "_blank)) published in the early 70s. The initial paragraphs clearly state the doble side of modernity/coloniality, although Illich doesn´t use this vocabulary. However, he was thinking the double side of development: the salvationist rhetoric of modernity that conceals the imperial logic of coloniality. By uday’s end and in closing the conversation, a series of points remain open for future ¨tertulias.¨¶ What are the spaces in which the coloniality can be effective?¶ The overall project, long term, is to decolonize all areas of the colonial matrix (or patron) of power to release the fullness of human relationships. This requires a horizon of life that displaces the horizon of growth / enrichment / corruption with growth management to live in harmony rather than in [competition to have more.](http://wpfdc.org/economics/883-w-mignolo-the-economy-of-more-is-no-longer-sustainable)¶ The sphere of **knowledge is critical** since controlling knowledge means to control subjectivities. [Decolonizing epistemolog](http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780823249343)y is necessary to release sensing and thinking from the prison house of aesthetics and philosophy. So to decolonize knowledge is tantamount with [decolonizing being, subjectivity.](http://www.decolonialtranslation.com/english/maldonado-on-the-coloniality-of-being.pdf)¶ In this process, **education is key**. This is necessary and possible **to decolonize education** as schooling **to free learning and creativity** from global/imperial and local/state managements. The process of learning shall focus on the plenitude of people and it should take precedence over the formation of ¨experts¨ and ¨citizens¨ at the service of the state.¶

### 2ac – fairness

#### We access fairness better- economic and interstate fairness is a prerequisite– sacrificing that for procedural fairness proves the case is an impact turn.

#### There’s also no reason the neg should have thigs like politics- fairness is derived from overall division of ground and not specific issues

#### The impact’s inevitable– new unpredictable policy affs can always be broken– plus st. marks already read this aff against you so there’s no excuse for not researching it.

**Their conception of fairness kills education and turns us into technocrats**

Richard **Delgado, ’92** (Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)

It is important to know when we are being gulled, manipulated, and duped. n1 It is even more important to know when we are unwittingly doing this to ourselves -- when we are using shopworn legal scripts and counterscripts, going around endlessly in circles, getting nowhere. n2 Understanding how we use predictable arguments to rebut other predictable arguments in a predictable sequence -- "The plaintiff should have the freedom to do X," "No -- the defendant should have the security not to have X done to her"; "The law should be flexible, permitting us to do justice in particular cases," "No -- the law must be determinate; only bright-line rules are administrable and safe" n3 -- frees us to focus on real-world questions that do matter. We can begin to see how the actions we take as lawyers, law students, and legal scholars advance or retard principles we hold dear. n4 We can see where the scripts come from and, perhaps, how to write new and better ones. <Continues>

Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus objective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predictable "principle." n25 These arguments invite us to take sides for or against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analytical divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of powerful repeat players like corporations, human experimenters, action-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men. n26

How does this happen? Notice that in many cases it is the stronger party -- the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date -- that wants to apply an objective standard to a key event. n27 The doctor wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the average patient would find material. n28 The male partygoer wants the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of her outward manifestations. n29 The tobacco company wants the warning on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies.

What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more [\*818] likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my opinion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost a commonplace that we construct the social world. n30 We do this through stories, narratives, myths, and symbols -- by using tools that create images, categories, and pictures. n31 Over time, through repetition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and are accepted as "the way things are." n32 Recently, outsider jurisprudence n33 has been developing means, principally "counterstorytelling," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths and narratives. n34 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the dominant account. n35

The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37

<continues>

I began by observing that law-talk can lull and gull us, tricking us into thinking that categories like objective and subjective, and the stylized debates that swirl about them, really count when in fact they either collapse or appear trivial when viewed from the perspective of cultural power. If we allow ourselves to believe that these categories do matter, we can easily expend too much energy replicating predictable, scripted arguments -- and in this way, the law turns once-progressive people into harmless technocrats. n70

### 2ac – limits

#### We’re the core of the topic, and any interpretation that excludes our aff is unpredictable and turns predictability–the aff is literally about engagement with Cuba which solves their limits offense– their only offense is derived from an arbitrary distinction between fiated advocacies and our aff which our impact turns outweigh.

#### Counter-interpretation: their interpretation and our aff- solves their offense.

### 2ac – ground

#### We provide tons of grounds– the heg good k, defending status quo approaches towards latin America, the neolib k, appeasement da, alternate methodologies, and critiques of talking about imperialism all solve

#### Education is an impact turn to this– it’s a question of whether the ground they provide should be relevant to the topic at all.

### 2ac – stasis/predictability

#### Additionally, predictability merely replicates epistemic certainty where we have to know everything–this is bad because it results in dehumanization and otherization of the periphery, resulting in endless war–that’s Burke and Lottringer

### 2ac – meszaros

#### Their framework is also another conservative method to block and obfuscate the ideology of the 1ac- this results in the creation and sustainment of colonialism which outweighs their procedural impacts.

**The procedural “bracketing out” of our Affirmative is a strategy to maintain the status-quo**

**Meszaros, 1989** (Istvan, Chair of Philosophy at the University of Sussex, The Power of Ideology, p. 232-234)

**Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality** – the self-proclaimed Wertfeihert or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – **stronger than in the field of methodology.** Indeed, **we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are systematically excluded** (**or** suitably **‘bracketed out’**) **by the scientifically adequate method itself**, **thereby** saving one from unnecessary complication and **securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome**. **Claims and procedures of this kind are**, of course, **extremely problematical**. For **they** **circularly assume that their enthusiasm for** the virtues of ‘methodological **neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of possibility** – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plane of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character. In reality, of course, **this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of methodology** (and ‘meta-theory’) **is said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed.** Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’. Yet, curiously enough, **the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are a priori excluded from this rational discourse as ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc.** **The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies, in the name of methodology itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse**. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them. This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For – **far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry – the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent**, in fact, **to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter**. Instead, **the stipulated** ‘common’ methodological **procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology**: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point a new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for its own sake continues to be pursued. And **that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose.** 6.1.2 Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interest and ensuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But **to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’** (**or by putting into methodological ‘brackets’**) **the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality**. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennes version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ to the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – inevitably always favours the established order. And **it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘out of bounds’ to the potential contestants, on the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology**. However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it ought to be fairly obvious that to consent not to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of that order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order. Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people who belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing short of a methodological miracle. Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational communality, the **elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms**. **This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems** not on the plan of self-referential theory and methodology, but **as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes.** In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc., the conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of ‘rational discourse’ in the humanities and social sciences, in the interest of the ruling ideology. **What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are mediated by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of the discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole**. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models’ and ‘paradigms’? **Once**, though, **such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to be considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions on the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constituted.** This is why the allegedly ‘non-ideological’ ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying. Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that tend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated – at time completely bewildering – mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical interrelationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.